polyfill.io (2024): What Happens When a CDN Domain Changes Hands
A factual account of the 2024 polyfill.io incident, in which a widely embedded JavaScript CDN domain was acquired and began serving malicious code to a large number of websites.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
A factual account of the 2024 polyfill.io incident, in which a widely embedded JavaScript CDN domain was acquired and began serving malicious code to a large number of websites.
A factual retrospective on the 2013 Target breach, in which attackers used credentials stolen from a third-party refrigeration contractor to reach the retail network and deploy point-of-sale malware.
A factual retrospective on the January 2003 SQL Slammer worm, which exploited a patched buffer overflow in Microsoft SQL Server and doubled in size every 8.5 seconds, disrupting internet infrastructure globally.
A factual look at Spring4Shell, the March 2022 remote code execution vulnerability in Spring Framework, including why its real-world impact was narrower than the initial Log4Shell comparisons suggested.
A factual retrospective on Stuxnet, the malware discovered in 2010 that targeted Siemens PLCs controlling uranium enrichment centrifuges, and why it reset expectations about targeted attacks on physical systems.
A factual explanation of the Spectre and Meltdown speculative execution side-channel vulnerabilities disclosed in January 2018, which affected processors from multiple vendors and could not be fully fixed in software.
A factual retrospective on the 2023 3CX desktop app compromise, notable because the attackers reached 3CX through a prior supply chain compromise of a different vendor, producing a chain of two linked attacks.
A factual retrospective on the 2021 Codecov Bash Uploader compromise, where attackers modified a widely used CI script to exfiltrate environment variables, including credentials, from thousands of build pipelines.
A factual account of the 2018 event-stream npm compromise, in which a new maintainer added a malicious dependency targeting a specific cryptocurrency wallet, and what it revealed about maintainer-trust risk.
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