Catch secrets before they reach the repo. Rotate fast when they do. Gitleaks plus Lino inline detection at commit time, deep history scanning on existing repos, and an automated rotation workflow wired into your secret manager.
Most secret leaks aren't exotic. They're a hardcoded .env, a forgotten config file, a hardcoded test fixture, a debug log that escaped to a public repo. The hard part isn't detection — it's catching them at the right moment and rotating quickly enough.
Most secret scanners run in CI, after the push. By then the credential is in the remote, and the rotation timer started ten minutes ago. The window between commit and rotation is the breach window.
Every team has a couple of repos with 8 years of history and unknown secret hygiene. Scanning the full git history is slow and noisy, so nobody runs it. The leaked credentials sit in old refs forever.
You find the leaked key. Then someone has to log into the AWS console, find the right IAM user, rotate the credential, update three deployment environments, and verify nothing broke. That's a two-hour manual chore that often slips a day.
You bought Vault. You wrote a policy. Engineers still hardcode dev credentials for "just a minute" and forget. Without an inline check, intentions don't matter.
Gitleaks rules and the Lino inline model run together in the pre-commit hook. The hook denies the commit before it hits the remote, with a sub-60ms verdict and a one-line explanation.
First-run deep scan against the full git history of every repo. Branches, tags, dangling refs, packfiles. Findings deduplicated and surfaced in the secrets dashboard, ranked by rotation urgency.
Confirmed leaked credentials flow into a rotation pipeline. The platform talks to Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Azure Key Vault to mint a replacement, updates the deployment surface, and revokes the old credential when traffic confirms the cutover.
Engineer pushed an AWS access key in a debug fixture from a laptop without the pre-commit hook installed.
Server-side scan on the remote catches the leak. Push is rejected; engineer notified inline.
Key fingerprint resolved against AWS to identify the IAM user and active permissions.
Replacement credential minted in AWS Secrets Manager and rotated into the deployment env.
Traffic on the new credential confirmed via probe. Old credential revoked.
Signed rotation timeline filed for audit. Engineer gets a one-page write-up of what happened.
The platform speaks to the secret managers your team already runs. No sidecar credential store.
Token rotation, dynamic credentials, AppRole bootstrap.
Automatic rotation on detection, multi-region replication.
Managed identity rotation, certificate replacement.
Versioned secrets, IAM-bound rotation policies.
PAT rotation via OAuth app, fine-grained scope replacement.
AWS / Azure / GCP IAM credential rotation end-to-end.
For in-house secret stores; signed rotation request.
A mid-stage SaaS company ran the deep-history scan against 142 repos over a single weekend. The scan surfaced 84 credentials in old refs — 31 still active across AWS, GitHub, and a third-party billing API. The automated rotation pipeline replaced all 31 within four hours of confirmation. The post-mortem closed the loop: the offending repos had pre-commit hooks installed, the gap was branches pushed from CI runners. The platform's server-side check now blocks the same path.
Book a demo and we'll run a deep-history scan against one of your repos and walk through a live rotation in your sandbox.