Does build provenance stop a compromised build platform?
Provenance helps detect tampered inputs and impostor builders, but a compromised platform can still sign bad output. Know what it covers and misses.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Provenance helps detect tampered inputs and impostor builders, but a compromised platform can still sign bad output. Know what it covers and misses.
Yes. The RTOS kernel and its bundled libraries are shipped code with their own advisories. Here is how to list them, with versions, in a firmware SBOM.
Yes. Bundling a CLI into one executable hides its dependencies from manifest scanners. Generate the SBOM at build time and publish it with each release.
A GPG signature and a verified namespace show who published a jar and that it was not altered. They do not show the code is free of flaws. Myth vs fact.
Libraries fetched with ADD or curl inside a Dockerfile have no manifest entry, so many scans miss them. Where they show up and how to record them.
A frozen Python executable bundles the interpreter and libraries into one file. What a source scan sees, what it misses, and how to inventory the bundle.
No. A package-lock.json in a published library is not shipped to consumers, so apps resolve your dependency ranges fresh. What to do about it.
Update tools may run package managers that execute manifest code to rewrite lockfiles. See the safeguards and what to check before granting access.
Yes, if the cache can be written by others. Compare Go, pip and npm checks that detect a changed package after restore, and where to run them.
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