Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
fs::canonicalize resolves `..` and symlinks into one absolute path, but it can't fix TOCTOU races, missing files, or Windows prefix quirks on its own. Here's the safe pattern.
Why std::filesystem::weakly_canonical alone doesn't stop path traversal in C++, and the containment check every extraction, upload, or plugin loader needs beside it.
Nokogiri wraps libxml2, and one misconfigured parse call can leak local files or trigger SSRF. Here's how NONET and NOENT actually work, and how to lock them down.
How the libxmljs noent option silently reopens XML External Entity (XXE) attacks in Node.js apps, and the exact parser settings that shut it down for good.
How the libxml2 XML_PARSE_NOENT flag enables XXE in C++ codebases, the real CVEs behind it, and the exact code changes needed to remove it safely.
Why lxml's XMLParser resolves external entities by default, how resolve_entities=False actually stops XXE, and where Python teams still leave file-read and SSRF paths open.
Java's DocumentBuilderFactory parses XML with external entities on by default, turning XML uploads into file-read and SSRF vectors. Here is how to lock it down.
XXE in C# lives at the XmlResolver and DtdProcessing settings. Here's how .NET's defaults evolved since 2014 and exactly how to lock down XmlDocument, XmlTextReader, and XmlReaderSettings.
Go's standard XML parser resists classic XXE by design, but cgo bindings and SAML libraries can reopen it. Here's how the DisallowDTD pattern closes the gap.
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