ASVS 5.0 V11.4.1: Stop Using MD5 for Crypto
ASVS V11.4.1 allows only approved hashes for signatures, HMAC, KDFs and random bit generation, and bans MD5 for any cryptographic purpose. Find and replace it.
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ASVS V11.4.1 allows only approved hashes for signatures, HMAC, KDFs and random bit generation, and bans MD5 for any cryptographic purpose. Find and replace it.
ASVS V11.3.5 requires that any encryption plus MAC combination runs in encrypt then MAC order. Prefer AEAD so you never choose the order yourself.
ASVS V11.3.4 requires single use numbers such as nonces and IVs to be unique per key and data element, generated the right way for the algorithm. Patterns that hold up.
ASVS V11.3.3 requires encrypted data to resist tampering, preferably with authenticated encryption. Why CBC alone is not enough and how to use AEAD with context.
ASVS V11.3.2 requires approved ciphers and modes such as AES with GCM. A short allow list, safe defaults for Node and Go, and a test that catches drift.
ASVS V11.3.1 forbids insecure block modes like ECB and weak padding like PKCS#1 v1.5. See what to use instead, with code, and how to catch offenders in review.
ASVS V11.2.5 wants crypto errors handled so they never help an attacker, as in padding oracle attacks. Return one generic failure and log the detail privately.
ASVS V11.2.4 requires constant time crypto operations with no short circuit comparisons. Use compare_digest and friends, and test for timing differences.
ASVS V11.2.3 says every cryptographic primitive needs at least 128 bits of security. What that means for RSA, ECC, AES and hashes, and how to check your config.
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