Employee Name Gathering (T1589.003): What Defenders Can Do
Employee names guide phishing lures and email address guessing. Why this reconnaissance is nearly impossible to detect and where to put effort instead.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Employee names guide phishing lures and email address guessing. Why this reconnaissance is nearly impossible to detect and where to put effort instead.
Email addresses are easy to find and easy to confirm by probing authentication services. What MITRE documents and what defenders can log, limit, and test.
Adversaries gather credentials from phishing, leaked data, code repositories, and infostealer logs. What MITRE says, what you can detect, and how to cut exposure.
How adversaries collect names, email addresses, credentials, and MFA details before an attack, and what defenders can do about data they cannot fully hide.
MITRE now lists adversary access to generative AI tools as a resource. What it covers, why detection shifts to phishing and fraud, and how to prepare people and process.
Adversaries watch open and closed vulnerability databases to decide what to target. Here is what MITRE says and how to shrink the window between disclosure and your fix.
Adversaries buy, steal, or download exploits instead of writing them. Because the buying is invisible, patch speed and exploit attempt detection are what you control.
Adversaries can buy or steal TLS certificates to make their infrastructure look trusted. What MITRE documents, what defenders can still watch, and how to respond.
Adversaries buy or steal code signing certificates to make malicious software look trusted. MITRE T1588.003 explained, with protection steps for key owners.
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