Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
How to govern Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code with provenance tracking and permission scoping — beyond after-the-fact SCA scanning of agent-written code.
MCP servers and agent skills give AI agents new power—and new attack surface. Here's how tool poisoning and rug-pull attacks work, and how to stop them.
Unauthorized MCP servers running on developer laptops are the agent-era equivalent of shadow IT. Here is how to inventory them, see them at runtime, and bring them under policy.
NIST SP 800-218A turned the SSDF into an AI community profile in July 2024. Eighteen months later, what does real adoption look like for AI software teams?
An LLM agent with tools is a deputy that holds privileges its users do not. Attackers exploit that gap by tricking the agent into using those privileges on their behalf — here is how to design defenses that hold up.
A single crafted email could exfiltrate data from Microsoft 365 Copilot without a user click. We walk the attack chain, the patch, and the lessons for agent operators.
A repository named Open-OSS/privacy-filter impersonated OpenAI's release, copied its model card verbatim, and shipped a loader.py that pulled an infostealer. It reached #1 trending with ~244,000 downloads before removal.
Cyera disclosed Bleeding Llama in May 2026: a heap out-of-bounds read in Ollama's GGUF loader leaking process memory. We dissect the bug and the exposure across 300,000 Ollama deployments.
MCP servers expose three distinct prompt-injection surfaces — resource contents, tool outputs, and sampling requests — and each one needs its own defense layer. Here is how to think about them together.
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