Many claims about quantum threats mix a real risk with a wrong timeline or the wrong target. This post checks seven of them against NIST and CISA statements. The short version: the risk to public-key cryptography is real and worth planning for, but encryption is not broken today and AES is not in danger.
Claims about capability
Myth 1: Quantum computers already break encryption
Fact: CISA states that quantum decryption capable of breaking modern public-key encryption does not yet exist. It also says organizations must begin preparing now.
Myth 2: AES-256 is obsolete
Fact: NIST's FAQ says current applications can keep using AES with 128, 192 or 256 bit keys, and that Grover's algorithm is likely to give little or no advantage against AES.
Myth 3: Bigger RSA keys solve it
Fact: RSA is on NIST's quantum-vulnerable list at the strengths it covers. Larger keys do not change the category. The fix is a different algorithm.
Claims about standards and deadlines
Myth 4: Post-quantum standards are not ready
Fact: NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 on 13 August 2024. HQC and Falcon are in additional standardization as extras, but the three finished standards can be built against now.
Myth 5: We must finish by a legal deadline in 2030
Fact: The 2030 and 2035 dates come from a NIST initial public draft and from a federal memorandum goal. They are not a law for private companies. Check your contracts and regulators.
Claims about who is affected
Myth 6: Only governments need to care
Fact: Anyone with data that must stay secret for years is exposed to harvest now, decrypt later. The data lifetime matters more than the organization type.
Myth 7: Hybrid means we are safe forever
Fact: NIST's draft expects hybrid modes to typically be temporary, leading to another transition. Hybrid is a hedge, not a destination.
What to do with this
- Build an inventory of public-key use.
- Rank by data lifetime.
- Start with key exchange.
- Make algorithms swappable.
- Track policy dates from official sources, not from vendor marketing.
A free dependency scan at gold.safeguard.sh/scan can list the libraries your project pulls in, which helps the inventory step.
A good habit for any claim you hear: ask what the source is, whether it is a standard, a draft or an estimate, and whether the date is a policy goal or a forecast. Most of the confusion above comes from mixing those categories. Sorting claims that way takes a minute and saves a lot of wasted planning, and it is the same habit that helps with any fast-moving security topic where hype outruns the evidence.
Quick check
Which myth is the most expensive to believe?
Probably the one that says nothing needs doing yet. Migration takes years, and long-lived data is already exposed to recording today.
Is quantum the same as post-quantum?
No. Quantum computing is the hardware. Post-quantum cryptography is classical algorithms designed to resist attacks from it.
Sources
- CISA, Quantum
- NIST PQC FAQs
- NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project
- NIST IR 8547 initial public draft, full text
Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.
