Satellites rarely get hacked in space. The documented commercial cases almost all start on the ground or at the edges: a misconfigured VPN appliance that let an intruder into the network that manages tens of thousands of satellite modems, mission control software with web flaws, user terminals with hardcoded passwords or a bypassable boot chain, and satellite links that send sensitive traffic unencrypted to anyone with a TV dish. Researchers have also shown that the flight software on satellites, including popular open source frameworks, has the same memory safety bugs as any other embedded code. And GNSS spoofing, which feeds false position and time to receivers, now affects aviation and shipping every day. Most of the risk sits in software, and much of that software came from somewhere else.
That is the short answer. This guide is the long one. It explains the four segments of a space system (space, ground, link and user) and the software each one runs, from flight software frameworks such as the open source cFS and F Prime to mission control tools such as Yamcs and OpenC3 COSMOS. It walks through the cases that shaped commercial space security: the 2022 KA-SAT modem wiping, described from Viasat's own statement; Lennert Wouters' 2022 fault injection research on the Starlink user terminal; James Pavur's satellite broadband and maritime eavesdropping research; the 2025 "Don't Look Up" study that found half of the GEO links it observed carried cleartext IP traffic; the 2023 "Space Odyssey" analysis of satellite firmware; and the run of CVEs in open source space software since 2023. It covers command link encryption under the CCSDS Space Data Link Security protocol, GNSS spoofing, the supply chain of commercial off the shelf parts and open source code in small satellites, the standards that apply, and hardening checklists for satellite operators, ground segment operators, terminal users and makers.
It is written from the attacker's point of view for defenders. For each attack you will find how it works and why, what the attacker needs, the impact, how to detect it and how to protect against it. You will not find exploit code, tool command lines, payloads or step by step instructions. Where a tool is named, it is named as context for authorised testing.
A note on the law. Testing satellites, ground systems, user terminals or satellite links that you do not own, or have no written permission to test, is illegal in most countries. Intercepting communications you are not a party to is also illegal in many places, even when the signal reaches your roof. Everything here is for protecting your own systems, your organisation's systems with authorisation, or the products you build. The researchers cited here worked on equipment they owned, on systems whose operators cooperated, or with legal clearance from their institutions, and they disclosed what they found.
This post is part of a device security series. The companion guide on how Wi-Fi gets hacked and how to secure it covers the local networks that sit behind most satellite terminals, and how routers get hacked covers the device class a satellite modem most resembles. Our posts on fabless chip designers and the software supply chain and how a laptop is built explain where the chips, boot ROMs and SDKs inside terminals and small satellites come from.
Contents
- How does a space system work, and what software does it run?
- What is the attack surface of a space system?
- What does an attacker need to attack a satellite system?
- Which cases shaped commercial space security?
- How are ground stations and mission control attacked?
- How did the 2022 KA-SAT modem wiping work?
- How are satellite user terminals and modems attacked?
- Can satellite internet traffic be intercepted?
- How are command and telemetry links protected?
- How is satellite onboard software attacked?
- How does GNSS spoofing work, and how do you detect it?
- How should you weigh these risks?
- How do you detect attacks on space systems?
- Why is space security a supply chain problem?
- Which standards and industry groups apply?
- How should people and businesses that use satellite terminals protect themselves?
- How should satellite operators secure their spacecraft and links?
- How should ground segment operators secure ground stations and mission control?
- How should satellite and terminal makers build secure products?
- How Safeguard helps teams that build space software
- The takeaway
- Frequently asked questions
How does a space system work, and what software does it run?
A space system has four segments. The space segment is the satellite. The ground segment is mission control, ground stations and the operator's IT. The link segment is the radio links between them. The user segment is the terminals, modems and receivers customers use. Every segment runs software, and each has documented security research or incidents.
Figure 1. The four segments of a commercial space system. Each runs software and each is a way in.
The space segment
A satellite has two halves. The bus keeps it alive: power, thermal control, attitude determination and control (pointing the satellite the right way), propulsion on some designs, radios, and an onboard computer running flight software. The payload does the paying job. On a communications satellite that means transponders and beams, and on newer designs onboard processing and routing. On an Earth observation satellite it means cameras and sensors.
Flight software is embedded software with unusual constraints. The computer is often modest, because radiation tolerant parts lag consumer hardware by years and small satellites run on tight power budgets. The software must keep running for years without anyone touching the hardware. And everything it learns about the world, and every instruction it gets, arrives over a radio link.
What software runs on a satellite?
The stack looks a lot like any other embedded device, with radios as the front door.
Figure 2. The layers of satellite onboard software and the inputs that reach them.
- Hardware and boot ROM. A processor or system on chip (SoC), memory, radios, sensors and actuators. Small satellites lean heavily on commercial off the shelf (COTS) parts. The first code that runs is a boot ROM burned into the chip, followed by a bootloader that loads the flight image.
- Operating system. A real time operating system (RTOS) such as FreeRTOS or RTEMS on smaller computers, or embedded Linux on larger ones.
- Abstraction layer. Code that hides the OS and board from the applications. In NASA's open source core Flight System (cFS) this is the Operating System Abstraction Layer (OSAL) and the Platform Support Package (PSP).
- Flight software framework. The cFS project describes itself on GitHub as "a generic flight software architecture framework used on flagship spacecraft, human spacecraft, cubesats, and Raspberry Pi", released under the Apache 2.0 licence. F Prime (written F´) is another open source framework on GitHub that "enables rapid development and deployment of spaceflight and other embedded software applications", with a component model, C++ framework, code generation tools and testing tools. Many companies also write their own frameworks or license one from a vendor.
- Communications stack. On most missions, commands travel in telecommand (TC) frames and data comes back in telemetry (TM) frames defined by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), the body that standardises space data links. Security can be added with the CCSDS Space Data Link Security protocol, covered below. Many CubeSats use the CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP), whose open source implementation libcsp describes itself as "a small protocol stack written in C" designed for "distributed embedded systems in smaller networks, such as Cubesats".
- Flight applications. Attitude control, power and thermal management, payload control, schedulers, file transfer, and memory and table management. Tables are parameter files that change behaviour without new code.
The ground segment
The ground segment commands the satellite and receives its data. It includes mission control software, which builds and sends telecommands, decodes telemetry and drives operations displays. Two widely used open source examples are Yamcs, "a framework for mission control", and OpenC3 COSMOS, which its CVE records describe as providing "the functionality needed to send commands to and receive data from one or more embedded systems". Around that sit ground stations and antennas, network management systems, the operator's corporate IT, and increasingly cloud services. AWS Ground Station, for example, is "a fully managed service that lets you control satellite communications, process data" without building antenna infrastructure. When the antenna is rented by the minute, the security of the ground segment becomes the security of a cloud account.
The link segment
The links are radio paths: the telecommand uplink from ground to satellite, the telemetry downlink back, feeder links between the satellite and gateway stations, user links to terminals, and on some constellations inter satellite links. A geostationary (GEO) satellite sits about 36,000 km up and each beam can cover a huge area, which matters for eavesdropping. GNSS (global navigation satellite system) signals such as GPS and Galileo are a special case: receive only, very faint at the Earth's surface, and trusted by billions of devices for position and time.
The user segment
User terminals are the dishes and modems customers install: home broadband dishes, very small aperture terminals (VSATs) for businesses, ships and remote sites, aviation terminals on aircraft, and IoT modules. A terminal is a computer with a radio and usually a web management interface. Behind it sits a network: a home, a ship, an aircraft cabin, a cell tower using satellite backhaul, or a wind farm. GNSS receivers in phones, ships, aircraft and timing systems are also part of the user segment.
What is the attack surface of a space system?
The attack surface is every place where untrusted input reaches software in any segment. In documented commercial cases it clusters on the ground side (remote access appliances, mission control web interfaces, IT and cloud accounts), on user terminals, and on unencrypted links. Onboard flight software is harder to reach but has the same bug classes as any embedded code.
Figure 3. Entry points by segment, labelled with the documented cases this guide covers.
A few properties make space systems different from a typical enterprise network:
- You cannot walk up to the satellite. No hands on recovery, no reflashing over a cable, no replacement of a bricked board. If an attack or a bad update leaves the spacecraft unable to receive commands, the asset may be lost.
- Patching is slow and expensive. Updates travel over low bandwidth links during short contact windows, and every change must be tested against flight hardware first. Some parts, such as boot ROMs, can never be changed after launch.
- Long lives. Satellites can operate for many years, and the software design choices made before launch stay in orbit for that whole time.
- Broadcast physics. A downlink beam can be received across a continent. Anything not encrypted is public to anyone in the footprint with the right equipment.
- Shared infrastructure. One network management system can reach every terminal on a network. That is efficient for operations, and it is exactly what made the KA-SAT incident so large.
What does an attacker need to attack a satellite system?
It depends on the target. Reading unencrypted GEO traffic needs a few hundred dollars of TV equipment and patience. Attacking ground systems needs the skills of any network intrusion. Commanding a satellite directly needs protocol knowledge, a powerful uplink and, if security is enabled, valid keys. Fault injection on a terminal needs physical access and electronics skills.
| Target | What the attacker needs | Rough barrier |
|---|---|---|
| Unencrypted GEO user or backhaul traffic | Consumer dish, motor, TV tuner card, software to parse vendor protocols | Low cost, real skill in signal processing |
| Ground segment IT and remote access | Internet reachable appliance or web app with a flaw, or stolen credentials | Same as any enterprise intrusion |
| Mission control web interfaces | Network access to the interface, a flaw such as XSS or weak login controls | Moderate, often needs a foothold first |
| User terminal management interfaces | Network access to the terminal, default or hardcoded credentials | Low where interfaces are exposed |
| User terminal boot chain | The physical device, soldering, a fault injection rig | High per device, affects one unit |
| Direct telecommand to a satellite | Protocol knowledge, a capable uplink and antenna, the right frequency and timing, keys if SDLS authentication is on | High, and very high with authentication |
| GNSS spoofing | A software defined radio and transmitter near the target receiver | Moderate, local in effect |
| Supply chain | Access to a supplier, an open source project or a build system | High, very high payoff |
The pattern matters for prioritising. The cheapest attacks (reading unencrypted links, abusing exposed ground and terminal interfaces) are also among the most damaging, and they are fully within the control of operators to fix. The attacks people imagine first, hijacking a satellite from a backyard, are the hardest.
Which cases shaped commercial space security?
A handful of public cases set the agenda: SATCOM terminal backdoors in 2014, satellite broadband and maritime eavesdropping research in 2020, the KA-SAT modem wiping and the Starlink terminal fault injection research in 2022, the Space Odyssey firmware analysis in 2023, and a steady run of CVEs in open source flight and ground software from 2023 to 2026.
Figure 4. A timeline of documented research and incidents in commercial space systems.
The sections below take each segment in turn. Two observations first. Almost every case on the timeline was found by researchers and fixed through disclosure, not exploited at scale. The exception, KA-SAT, did not touch the satellite at all. It went through the ground network to the terminals.
How are ground stations and mission control attacked?
Ground systems are attacked like any other IT: through internet facing appliances, stolen credentials, phishing, ransomware and flaws in web applications. What makes them special is what they control. A mission control system can send commands to a spacecraft, and a network management system can push configuration to every terminal on a network.
Mission control software has web bugs too
Modern mission control runs in a browser. That brings the full web attack surface into the control room. The open source Yamcs project has had several published CVEs:
- CVE-2023-46470 and CVE-2023-46471: cross site scripting in Yamcs 5.8.6, one "via crafted telecommand in the timeline view of the ArchiveBrowser". Cross site scripting (XSS) lets attacker supplied script run in an operator's browser session.
- CVE-2023-47311: an issue in Yamcs 5.8.6 that "allows attackers to send arbitrary telecommands in a Command Stack via Clickjacking", where an operator is tricked into clicking something that performs a different action.
- CVE-2026-44596: before 5.12.7, the authentication endpoint "lacked any rate limiting, account lockout, or failed-attempt throttling", which allowed unlimited password guessing.
OpenC3 COSMOS had a cluster of fixes in version 5.19.0 for its open source edition, including a reflected XSS in the login function (CVE-2024-43795), a path traversal that let an authenticated user download text files from the server (CVE-2024-46977), and storage of the user's password "unencrypted in the LocalStorage of a web browser" (CVE-2024-47529), which turns any XSS into credential theft.
At Black Hat USA 2025, researchers from VisionSpace Technologies presented a broader study of open source space software. The Register reported that the team found five CVEs in Yamcs that together "would allow an attacker a free run of the application", seven in OpenC3 COSMOS including remote code execution and XSS, and flaws in cFS and the CryptoLib security library covered below. In a simulation, they showed a thruster command sent to a simulated spacecraft without the course change showing up immediately on the controller's screen. No real satellite was involved.
Why it works. Mission control tools were historically used on isolated networks by trusted staff, so web hardening was not the first priority. Telemetry and command definitions are also data that flows into the interface, which gives attackers a path to inject content.
Impact. An attacker who controls an operator's browser session can send commands as that operator, hide or alter displayed telemetry, or steal credentials.
How to protect. Patch mission control software on the same cadence as any internet facing application, put it behind strong authentication with multifactor login, never expose it to the internet, and treat telemetry and command definitions as untrusted input. Require a second person or a second factor to approve critical commands.
Corporate IT and ransomware
Satellite businesses run on ordinary IT, and ordinary IT gets ransomware. In September 2023, ORBCOMM, whose businesses include hybrid satellite and cellular connectivity under its SKYWAVE brand, confirmed a ransomware attack that hit its FleetManager platform and Blue Tree product line. BleepingComputer reported that trucking customers could not track inventory or use Blue Tree electronic logging devices and had to switch to paper logs. The satellites were never the target. The services that customers depended on were.
Cloud ground stations and the account problem
Ground station as a service moves antenna time, data processing and contact scheduling into a cloud console. That is a real improvement for small operators, and it moves the security question to identity: who can schedule contacts, change configurations or access downlinked data. A leaked access key or an overprivileged role in that account is a ground segment compromise. Apply the same controls you would to production cloud infrastructure: least privilege roles, no long lived keys, multifactor authentication, logging of every contact and configuration change, and separation between the accounts that hold mission keys and everything else.
How did the 2022 KA-SAT modem wiping work?
On 24 February 2022, an intruder used a misconfigured VPN appliance to reach the management segment of Viasat's KA-SAT network, then sent legitimate management commands that overwrote key data in the flash memory of tens of thousands of consumer modems, knocking them offline. The satellite and ground infrastructure were not compromised. Viasat shipped nearly 30,000 replacement modems.
This is the most consequential documented incident in commercial satellite communications, and it is a lesson in ground network design rather than space technology. The account below follows Viasat's own statement of 30 March 2022. It describes technical events and business impact only.
Figure 5. The KA-SAT sequence as Viasat described it.
What happened
- The way in. Viasat's forensics traced the intrusion to a misconfigured VPN appliance, which gave remote access "to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network". The intruder moved laterally to the part of the network used to manage and operate it.
- The first phase. At about 03:02 UTC on 24 February, "high volumes of focused, malicious traffic were detected" coming from SurfBeam2 and SurfBeam 2+ modems in the affected consumer partition. New modems kept appearing on the network for several hours, and legitimate modems struggled to stay connected.
- The destructive phase. The intruder used legitimate management commands against large numbers of residential modems at once. Those commands overwrote key data in the modems' flash memory, which left them unable to reach the network. From about 04:15 UTC, modems began dropping off across much of Europe over roughly 45 minutes.
- Scope. Viasat said several thousand customers in Ukraine and tens of thousands of other fixed broadband customers across Europe were affected. Its mobility users, and users on its other networks, were not.
What did not happen
Viasat's statement is unusually specific about what it found no evidence of. No compromise of the KA-SAT satellite or its supporting ground infrastructure. No tampering with modem software or firmware images. No supply chain interference. No use of the normal software or firmware update process. And no physical damage to the modems: they were disabled, not destroyed, and could be restored with a factory reset.
The business impact beyond broadband
Satellite modems were not only in homes. Reuters, via Euronews, reported on 28 February 2022 that the German turbine maker Enercon said a "massive disruption" of satellite connections was affecting 5,800 wind turbines in central Europe, cutting remote monitoring and control. The turbines kept running in "auto mode". That is the real reach of a terminal fleet: the customer's operations, not the dish.
Recovery
Viasat stabilised the network within hours and fully within several days. Some modems were recovered with over the air updates. Where that was not enough, it shipped nearly 30,000 replacement modems through distributors.
Why it worked, and what it teaches
The network management plane could send commands to every modem at once, and the path to it ran through a remote access appliance with a configuration error. No exotic technique was needed once that path existed. The lessons are general:
- Remote access appliances are the front door. Patch them, harden their configuration, require multifactor authentication and monitor them as critical assets.
- Segment the management plane. Reaching the network that manages terminals should require more than one control to fail.
- Rate limit and gate mass operations. A command that touches thousands of devices at once should require a second approval and should be throttled, so a mistake or an intrusion cannot reach the whole fleet in minutes.
- Design terminals to survive. A protected recovery partition and a factory reset path turned a potential hardware write off into a logistics problem. A terminal whose recovery image could also be overwritten would have been far worse.
- Watch for anomalies in the terminal fleet. Floods of new or reconnecting terminals and unusual management traffic were visible early.
How are satellite user terminals and modems attacked?
User terminals are network devices with radios, and they fail in the same ways as routers: exposed management interfaces, hardcoded credentials, outdated components, and boot chains that can be bypassed with physical access. Because one maker's terminal design ships in large numbers, a single flaw can apply to a whole fleet.
Backdoors and hardcoded credentials (2014)
At Black Hat USA 2014, Ruben Santamarta of IOActive published "SATCOM Terminals: Hacking by Air, Sea, and Land", built by reverse engineering publicly available firmware updates for terminals used in aviation, maritime and land settings. The paper documented backdoors, hardcoded credentials, undocumented protocols and weak encryption. Several became CVEs:
- CVE-2014-2964: Cobham Aviator 700D and 700E aviation terminals "have hardcoded passwords" for several programs, which "allows physically proximate attackers to gain privileges by sending a password over a serial line".
- CVE-2014-2941: Cobham Sailor 6000 maritime terminals "have hardcoded Tbus 2 credentials". The CVE record notes the vendor's position that there is "no possibility to exploit another user's credentials".
- CVE-2014-0326: the Pilot Below Deck Equipment and OpenPort implementations on Iridium terminals "allow remote attackers to read hardcoded credentials via the web interface".
Why it works. Terminals were often designed for installers and service engineers who needed a way in when customers forgot passwords. A fixed maintenance credential is convenient and it is the same in every unit.
Impact. Control of the terminal, and from it a foothold on the network behind it (a ship's or aircraft's systems, a remote site) or the ability to disrupt the link.
How to protect. For users: never expose terminal management interfaces to the internet or to untrusted network segments, change every credential that can be changed, and apply firmware updates. For makers: no shared or hardcoded credentials, unique per device secrets, and a documented recovery process that does not depend on a backdoor.
Fault injection on the Starlink user terminal (2022)
In 2022, Lennert Wouters of KU Leuven's COSIC research group presented "Glitched on Earth by Humans: A Black-Box Security Evaluation of the SpaceX Starlink User Terminal" at Black Hat USA. His Starlink-FI repository explains that the work achieved arbitrary code execution "using a custom modchip that performs voltage fault injection", which "can be used to bypass signature verification during execution of the System-on-Chip (SoC) ROM bootloader (BL1)".
Conceptually, voltage fault injection (glitching) briefly disturbs a chip's power supply at a precise moment so that an instruction is skipped or computed wrongly. If the disturbed instruction is the one that decides whether a firmware signature is valid, the chip can be made to accept code it should reject. Wired reported that the modchip used off the shelf parts costing about $25 and had to be attached to the dish's circuit board after physically opening it.
What the attacker needs. The physical terminal, the skill and patience to open it and attach the board, and the ability to time a glitch precisely. This is a per device attack.
Why it works, and why it is hard to fix. The first bootloader stage is burned into the SoC's ROM and cannot be updated. Wired reported that SpaceX paid Wouters through its bug bounty and issued a firmware update that made the attack harder, but that, per Wouters, the underlying issue could not be fully fixed without a new version of the main chip.
Impact, as the vendor framed it. After the talk, Starlink published a document that called the attack "technically impressive" and said: "We expect attackers with invasive physical access to be able to take malicious actions on behalf of a single Starlink kit using its identity, so we rely on the design principle of 'least privilege' to constrain the effects in the broader system." That is the right design response. A terminal is in the customer's hands, so the network must assume any single terminal can be fully compromised and limit what that identity can do.
How to protect. For makers: choose SoCs with fault injection countermeasures in the boot ROM, add redundant checks and glitch detection in later boot stages, give each terminal a unique identity with narrow privileges in the network, and run a bug bounty so researchers report rather than publish without warning. For operators: monitor for terminal identities behaving outside their profile.
Can satellite internet traffic be intercepted?
Yes, when it is not encrypted, and much of it is not. A 2025 study that scanned 411 transponders on 39 GEO satellites with consumer equipment found that 50% of the GEO links it observed carried cleartext IP traffic, including cellular backhaul, in flight Wi-Fi, utility and retail systems. Earlier research found the same for broadband and ships.
Satellite broadband and ships (2020)
James Pavur, then a DPhil student at Oxford, presented "Whispers Among the Stars" at Black Hat USA 2020. The abstract states that "an attacker using $300 of home television equipment can spy on these communications from thousands of miles away with virtually no risk of detection", across home broadband, wind farms, oil tankers and aircraft, and that "under the right conditions, attackers can even hijack active sessions over the satellite link".
The companion paper, "A Tale of Sea and Sky: On the Security of Maritime VSAT Communications" by Pavur, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders and Ivan Martinovic at IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020, demonstrated attacks "with less than $400 of widely-available television equipment". The abstract reports analysis of "more than 1.3 TB of real-world maritime VSAT recordings encompassing 26 million square kilometers of coverage area", on a network platform "representative of more than 60% of the global maritime VSAT services market", and found that "sensitive data belonging to some of the world's largest maritime companies is regularly leaked over VSAT ship-to-shore communications".
Half of GEO links in the clear (2025)
In October 2025, Wenyi Morty Zhang, Annie Dai, Keegan Ryan, Dave Levin, Nadia Heninger and Aaron Schulman of UC San Diego and the University of Maryland published "Don't Look Up: There Are Sensitive Internal Links in the Clear on GEO Satellites" at ACM CCS 2025, where it received a Distinguished Paper Award. From a university roof in San Diego, using a consumer dish with a motor and a TV tuner card, the team performed what the paper calls "the first broad scan of IP traffic on 39 GEO satellites across 25 distinct longitudes with 411 transponders using consumer-grade equipment". The headline: "We found 50% of GEO links contained cleartext IP traffic."
Figure 6. How often GEO links were protected in the 2025 Don't Look Up study.
The paper's table of exposed data lists cellular backhaul (call audio and SMS, encryption keys and subscriber identifiers), telecom call audio and metadata, retail inventory and internal communications, power grid repair and monitoring data, banking directory and ATM traffic, and aviation in flight entertainment audio and aircraft tail numbers. The project page adds that in flight Wi-Fi exposed passenger DNS lookups, while pilot flight information systems were encrypted, and that nearly all consumer browsing and app traffic already used TLS or QUIC. The problem was mostly internal and infrastructure traffic. The paper estimates that "any individual with a clear view of the sky and US$600 can set up their own GEO interception station".
The researchers disclosed to each affected party and confirmed fixes by rescanning for some of them. The paper reports that T-Mobile "quickly enabled encryption" on the backhaul links they found.
Why so much is unencrypted
The paper's discussion is the best explanation in print of why this keeps happening, and it reads as a list of things operators can change:
- Layers of abstraction. Satellite capacity is resold through several providers, and "typically customers choose whether to enable encryption". The vendors told the researchers that "no auditing tools exist" to check their own backhaul.
- Cost. "Enabling link-layer encryption can require additional license fees to use the crypto subsystem for specific satellite terminals and hubs."
- Efficiency. Encryption adds bandwidth overhead and power draw on solar powered terminals. One vendor told the authors that enabling encryption could cost 20 to 30% of capacity, and IPsec headers add 20 to 30 bytes per packet, which hurts small packet traffic such as voice.
- Reliability and troubleshooting. Some traffic was deliberately left in the clear to maximise reliability, and providers said encryption "made it impossible to troubleshoot network issues".
- Failing open. In several systems encryption had been disabled by misconfiguration or software updates, and the network "continued to function correctly with no apparent indication to the operators that no encryption was present".
There is also a physics reason. TCP performs badly over the long round trip to GEO, so satellite networks use performance enhancing proxies (PEPs) that split and accelerate TCP connections. End to end VPNs defeat those proxies, which pushes customers to switch them off. Pavur's team released QPEP, "an encrypted performance enhancing proxy designed to protect high-latency satellite connections without TCP performance degradation", as one answer to that trade off.
How to protect satellite links
- Assume the link is public. The Don't Look Up authors advise treating satellite links as "unsecured and public wireless networks".
- Encrypt at more than one layer. TLS for applications, IPsec or another VPN for networks, and the terminal's link layer encryption where the provider offers it.
- Verify, do not assume. Ask your provider whether link encryption is enabled for your service, get it in the contract, and test it. Misconfigurations that fail open are the common case.
- Watch for downgrades. After firmware updates or reconfiguration, recheck that encryption is still on.
- For carriers using satellite backhaul: protect backhaul interfaces with IPsec as the mobile standards intend, and do not rely on the radio layer encryption between phone and tower.
How are command and telemetry links protected?
Command and telemetry links are protected with authentication and encryption at the data link layer. The CCSDS Space Data Link Security (SDLS) protocol adds a security header and trailer to each frame for authentication, encryption or both, plus sequence numbers against replay. Its extended procedures add key management in flight. The code implementing it must itself be secure.
Why authentication matters more than secrecy
For telecommands, the most important property is authentication: proof that a command came from someone who holds the right key and was not altered or replayed. Encryption keeps commands and telemetry confidential, which matters for commercial reasons and because it makes reconnaissance harder. But a satellite that accepts unauthenticated commands can be told what to do by anyone with a capable transmitter and knowledge of the protocol. Historically some missions relied on obscurity: unpublished frequencies and formats. The Space Odyssey interviews, discussed below, found that attitude persists.
What SDLS provides
Figure 7. How CCSDS SDLS wraps a telecommand frame, and why the code that parses it matters.
CCSDS 355.0-B-2 (July 2022) specifies the Space Data Link Security Protocol. In its own words, it "provides a security header and trailer along with associated procedures that may be used with the CCSDS Telemetry, Telecommand, Advanced Orbiting Systems, and Unified Space Data Link Protocols". The security header carries a Security Parameter Index (SPI), which identifies the security association (the agreed key, algorithm and settings), along with the initialization vector and an anti replay sequence number. The trailer carries a Message Authentication Code (MAC). Receivers check sequence numbers against a window to "detect the unauthorized replay" of old frames.
CCSDS 352.0-B-2 (August 2019) specifies the cryptographic algorithms. For authenticated encryption, implementations "shall use Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)" with AES, and for authentication only, it specifies CMAC with AES.
CCSDS 355.1-B-1 (February 2020), the Extended Procedures, defines "the Key Management, Security Association Management, SDLS Monitoring and Control Services, and data structures required to operate the SDLS protocol over a space link". That includes command PDUs for over the air rekeying (OTAR), key activation, deactivation and destruction. The standard notes that OTAR is recommended but that "a space mission could also fly with pre-loaded keys only".
CCSDS 357.0-B-1 specifies "credentials to be used for authentication by CCSDS missions and ground systems", and the informational green books 350.0-G-3 and 350.1-G-3 cover how to apply security to CCSDS protocols and the threats against space missions.
The implementation is attack surface too
Security protocols are only as strong as the code that runs them, and that code parses attacker controlled bytes before it knows whether they are authentic. CryptoLib is an open source library that provides "a software-only solution using the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol - Extended Procedures (SDLS-EP) to secure communications between a spacecraft running the core Flight System (cFS) and a ground station". In 2025 it received a series of CVEs:
- CVE-2025-29909: in versions 1.3.3 and prior, "a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in CryptoLib's
Crypto_TC_ApplySecurity()allows an attacker to craft a malicious TC frame that causes out-of-bounds memory writes", which can lead to denial of service or, under certain conditions, remote code execution. CVSS 4.0 score 8.9. - CVE-2025-30216: a heap overflow in
Crypto_TM_ProcessSecuritywhen a telemetry packet's secondary header length exceeds the packet's total length. CVSS 3.1 score 9.4. - CVE-2025-46673: before 1.3.2, CryptoLib "does not check whether the SA is in an operational state before use, possibly leading to a bypass" of SDLS.
We cover these individually in our posts on CVE-2025-29909, CVE-2025-30216 and CVE-2025-46673.
The lesson. A memory safety bug in the frame parser can be reachable before authentication completes, which means the security layer itself becomes an entry point. Fuzz every parser that handles uplinked bytes, run it under sanitizers in test, keep security libraries current, and know which version is on every spacecraft.
How to protect command links
- Turn on SDLS authentication (or an equivalent) for every telecommand, including in safe mode. A mission that drops authentication when it enters safe mode creates the window an attacker needs.
- Use authenticated encryption for commands and telemetry where the link budget allows.
- Plan key management before launch: how keys are loaded, rotated, revoked and recovered if a key is lost.
- Enforce anti replay windows and alert on rejected frames.
- Keep the security library patched, and include it in the spacecraft's SBOM.
How is satellite onboard software attacked?
Researchers have shown that satellite firmware often lacks protections standard on phones and laptops, such as separating code from data, and that open source flight frameworks have had memory corruption, command injection and integer overflow bugs. Reaching them usually means sending crafted commands or files over the uplink, so command authentication is the first barrier and secure code the second.
Space Odyssey (2023)
At the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in May 2023, a team from Ruhr University Bochum and the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, led by Johannes Willbold with Moritz Schloegel, Ali Abbasi and Thorsten Holz among the authors, presented "Space Odyssey: An Experimental Software Security Analysis of Satellites", which won a Distinguished Paper Award. Ruhr University Bochum's summary explains that the team analysed three low Earth orbit satellites, "two small models and one medium-sized model", including research satellites and a commercial company's satellite, and found that "hardly any modern security concepts were implemented". For example, "there was no separation of code and data". The team showed it could "cut off the satellites from ground control and seize control of the systems, for example in order to take pictures with the satellite camera". A survey of 19 developers found the industry "relies primarily on security through obscurity".
Thorsten Holz also gave a useful caveat: "It wouldn't be all that easy to steer the satellite to another location, for example, to crash it or have it collide with other objects." Taking over a satellite's computer and safely flying it are different problems.
CVEs in open source flight software
The two most visible open source frameworks have both had published vulnerabilities, which is a sign of scrutiny rather than unusual weakness. Any widely used embedded framework will have bugs found in it.
cFS:
- CVE-2025-25373: "The Memory Management Module of NASA cFS (Core Flight System) Aquila has insecure permissions, which can be exploited to gain an RCE on the platform." A memory manager that can read and write arbitrary memory on command is powerful by design, which is why it must sit behind strong command authentication. The current cFS README notes that the Memory Manager is being deprecated from the open source bundle.
- CVE-2026-5475: memory corruption in
CFE_SB_TransmitMsgin the CCSDS header size handling, in cFS up to 7.0.0. - CVE-2026-5476: an integer overflow in table load size validation on 32 bit builds, rated difficult to exploit.
F Prime:
- CVE-2024-55030: "A command injection vulnerability in the Command Dispatcher Service of NASA Fprime v3.4.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands."
- CVE-2024-55028: a template injection in the F Prime ground Dashboard that "allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted Vue file".
- CVE-2026-41144: before version 4.2.0, a bounds check in the FileUplink component "uses U32 addition that wraps around on overflow", so a crafted data packet can bypass it. We cover it in our post on the F Prime FileUplink vulnerability.
The Register's report on the 2025 Black Hat research said the VisionSpace team found four critical flaws in cFS Aquila, two denial of service bugs, a path traversal and a remote code execution, and quoted the researchers: "We found actual vulnerabilities which allow you to crash the entire onboard software with an unauthenticated telemessage."
Why flight software has these bugs
- C and C++. Most flight software is written in memory unsafe languages for good reasons (determinism, size, heritage), which means bounds and integer bugs are always possible.
- Trusted channel assumptions. Code written on the assumption that only the operator can send commands tends not to validate them defensively.
- Limited hardware protections. Small processors may lack a memory management unit or execute protections, so a bug that would be contained on a laptop is not contained here.
- Testing against faults, not attackers. Space software is tested intensively for radiation upsets and hardware faults. Adversarial inputs are a different test discipline.
How to protect onboard software
- Put command authentication in front of everything, including file uploads, table loads and memory commands.
- Disable or remove dangerous capabilities (raw memory read and write, shell like services) from flight builds, or restrict them to authenticated, logged, two person procedures.
- Fuzz telecommand handlers, file uplink and table parsers, and run static analysis on every build.
- Use compiler hardening and whatever memory protection the processor offers.
- Keep framework versions current and know exactly which version each spacecraft runs.
- Design a protected safe mode and a recovery image that cannot be overwritten by normal commands.
How does GNSS spoofing work, and how do you detect it?
GNSS spoofing transmits counterfeit satellite navigation signals that a receiver accepts as real, so it computes a false position or time while appearing healthy. Jamming, by contrast, drowns the signals and the receiver loses its fix. Spoofing is detected by checking GNSS against other sources and by authenticated signals such as Galileo OSNMA.
GNSS signals arrive at the Earth's surface far weaker than the background noise, and the civil signals were designed without authentication. A transmitter nearby can therefore overpower them or imitate them.
Figure 8. Jamming makes a receiver blind. Spoofing makes it confidently wrong.
The superyacht experiment (2013)
In June 2013, with the owner's permission, a team from the University of Texas at Austin led by Todd Humphreys spoofed the GPS of the 213 foot superyacht White Rose of Drachs in the Mediterranean. The university's account describes how a device about the size of a briefcase broadcast "a faint ensemble of civil GPS signals" that "slowly overpowered the authentic GPS signals until they ultimately obtained control of the ship's navigation system". The key line for defenders: "Unlike GPS signal blocking or jamming, spoofing triggers no alarms." As Humphreys put it, "The ship actually turned and we could all feel it, but the chart display and the crew saw only a straight line."
Spoofing at scale in aviation (2024)
What was an experiment in 2013 became routine. In September 2024 the OPSGROUP GPS Spoofing WorkGroup, with 950 participants from across the aviation industry, published a final report stating: "On average 1500 flights per day are now spoofed, versus 300" earlier in 2024, a 500% increase. The workgroup called the safety impact "extremely significant".
Why it matters beyond navigation
GNSS is also a clock. Telecom networks, power grids, financial systems and data centres use it for timing, often without anyone thinking of it as a dependency. Our post on GPS timing as a hidden dependency covers that side.
How to detect and resist spoofing
- Signal authentication. Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) adds authentication to navigation data on the free E1 signal. GPS World reported in 2021 that a Septentrio receiver had authenticated OSNMA protected navigation data during testing. It authenticates the navigation data, and the open source OSNMAlib project notes that "the security of the OSNMA protocol can only be guaranteed if the receiver providing the navigation data is aware of its synchronization with respect to the Galileo System Time". So it raises the bar rather than ending the problem, and the receiver's clock matters. Our post does Galileo OSNMA stop GPS spoofing? goes deeper.
- Multi constellation, multi frequency receivers. Spoofing several systems on several bands consistently is harder than spoofing one.
- Cross checks. Compare GNSS position and time with inertial sensors, wheel or log speed, radar, network time sources and local clocks. A sudden jump, an impossible velocity or a clock offset is a signal.
- Antenna placement and design. Antennas that see the sky and not the horizon, and multi element antennas that can reject signals from one direction, help.
- Procedures. Train crews and operators to treat GNSS as one input among several, and to recognise drift.
- For makers of GNSS dependent products: log raw receiver measurements and quality indicators, expose spoofing and jamming flags to the application, and fail safe when sources disagree.
How should you weigh these risks?
Fix first what is both high impact and within easy reach: unencrypted links, internet facing ground systems and remote access, ransomware exposure in operator IT, and GNSS dependence without cross checks. Then plan for the harder, high impact cases: management plane abuse, crafted commands to flight software and compromised open source components.
Figure 9. A qualitative placement of attack classes by impact and effort. Placement varies by system.
Two caveats. First, this is an editorial assessment built from the public cases above, not a measurement. Second, "high effort" is not the same as "unlikely". Management plane abuse took one misconfigured appliance in the KA-SAT case, and supply chain attacks on open source are cheap for the attacker relative to their reach.
How do you detect attacks on space systems?
Detection works per segment: watch ground systems like any critical IT, watch the terminal fleet for abnormal behaviour and mass operations, watch the spacecraft for unexpected commands, rejected frames and state changes, and watch GNSS for disagreement with other sources.
Ground segment signals
- Authentication events on VPN and remote access appliances, especially new devices, new locations and configuration changes.
- Any access to the network management segment from outside expected jump hosts.
- Mass operations: commands sent to large numbers of terminals, configuration pushes outside change windows.
- Mission control audit logs: commands sent, who approved them, and failed logins. CVE-2026-44596 shows why failed login monitoring matters.
- Cloud ground station account activity: new keys, new roles, contact schedule changes.
Link and spacecraft signals
- SDLS rejected frames, bad MACs and replay window violations. A spike is a signal even if every frame was rejected.
- Commands in the telemetry history that operators did not send.
- Unexpected mode changes, resets, safe mode entries or memory and table loads.
- Interference reports and unexplained loss of lock, which can indicate jamming.
User segment signals
- Floods of new or reconnecting terminals, which were visible in the first hour of the KA-SAT incident.
- Terminals whose traffic, location or behaviour does not match their profile.
- Management interface access from unexpected addresses.
GNSS signals
- Position jumps, impossible speeds and clock offsets compared with other sources.
- Receiver flags for spoofing and jamming, and sudden changes in signal strength across all satellites at once.
Why is space security a supply chain problem?
Most code on a small satellite and its ground segment was written by someone else: chip vendors' boot ROMs, open source operating systems, frameworks such as cFS and F Prime, libraries such as libcsp and CryptoLib, and open source mission control. A flaw in any of them becomes the operator's problem, and the fix must travel the chain to orbit.
Figure 10. Where satellite software comes from, and why fixes take time to reach orbit.
COTS hardware
Small satellites use commercial off the shelf processors, radios and boards to keep cost and schedule down. That brings the same firmware supply chain as any consumer device, including boot ROMs that cannot be patched. The Starlink case shows the consequence in a terminal: a boot ROM weakness can only be fully fixed with new silicon. Our post on fabless chip designers and the software supply chain explains how SDKs and boot code travel from chip designers into products.
Open source in flight and ground software
Open source frameworks are a strength of the space industry. They give small teams tested foundations and let the whole sector find and fix bugs together, as the CVEs above show. But each one is a dependency to track:
- The cFS README states: "Bug/vulnerability fixes are addressed in the next sequential release of cFS. For cFS open source, these fixes are not backported to prior releases." A mission that froze its cFS version years before launch must port fixes itself.
- libcsp's v2.0 release notes say "XTEA has been removed, use a dedicated encryption library instead". The library still includes an optional HMAC module for message authentication. Teams that relied on the built in encryption need to know that it changed when they upgrade.
- CryptoLib, Yamcs, OpenC3 COSMOS and F Prime all shipped security fixes in 2024 to 2026. Ground software also brings the usual web stack, databases, container base images and their dependencies.
Why it is hard
- Long freeze, long life. Flight software is frozen well before launch and then flies for years. The gap between the version in orbit and the version with the fix grows every month.
- Vendored source. Frameworks and libraries are often copied into the mission's repository as source rather than pulled from a package manager, so no lockfile records them. Without an explicit SBOM entry, nobody can answer "which spacecraft run CryptoLib 1.3.3?"
- Patching in orbit. A fix must be rebuilt, tested on flight hardware, signed and uplinked in contact windows. Some missions cannot patch some components at all.
- Many hands. The bus maker, payload maker, integrator, ground software vendor and operator may all be different companies.
That is why an accurate software bill of materials (SBOM) for each spacecraft, each terminal model and each ground system release is the foundation. It turns a new CVE in an open source framework into a list of affected assets within minutes instead of a week of email. Our guides to firmware supply chain security and SBOMs for firmware and IoT devices cover the method, and our post on OTA update threats covers the update path that terminals depend on.
Which standards and industry groups apply?
For the link, the CCSDS security books: SDLS (355.0-B-2), its extended procedures (355.1-B-1), cryptographic algorithms (352.0-B-2) and authentication credentials (357.0-B-1). For managing cybersecurity across a space programme, ISO/TS 20517:2024. For ground IT, the usual frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001. For threat sharing, the Space ISAC.
- CCSDS security books. Covered above. They define how to protect space data links and give a shared reference for threats (350.1-G-3) and for applying security to CCSDS protocols (350.0-G-3).
- ISO/TS 20517:2024. Published in July 2024 by ISO/TC 20/SC 14 (space systems and operations), "Space systems: Cybersecurity management requirements and recommendations" "defines requirements and recommendations to be used for the management of cybersecurity in space systems", covering spacecraft, launchers, payloads, experiments, ground equipment and other facilities. It describes processes, techniques and responsibilities, and serves as a common reference for cybersecurity systems engineering across products, services and projects. It does not prescribe detailed technical controls.
- ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 for the operator's IT and cloud estate, where most documented incidents begin.
- Space ISAC. An information sharing and analysis centre for the space sector, based in Colorado Springs, which "shares among its members and trusted sources critical cyber-intelligence", runs a watch center and offers membership levels for "corporations, small business, research labs, and academia".
- Product security regulation. Terminals sold to consumers and businesses fall under general connected product rules in many markets, such as the EU Cyber Resilience Act's SBOM and vulnerability handling obligations. Our post on CRA SBOM obligations covers what that means for makers.
How should people and businesses that use satellite terminals protect themselves?
Keep the terminal's firmware updated, never expose its management interface, change any default credentials, encrypt your own traffic with a VPN and TLS, and put a firewall between the terminal and your internal network. Businesses should also confirm link encryption in writing with their provider.
Home users
- Install firmware updates for the terminal and the router behind it. Many update automatically, so leave that on.
- Do not expose the terminal's management page to the internet, and change any password you are allowed to change.
- Use apps and sites that use HTTPS (nearly all do), and consider a reputable VPN on GEO broadband.
- Secure the Wi-Fi network behind the terminal. Our Wi-Fi security guide covers the details.
- Buy terminals and routers from vendors that publish security updates and a way to report vulnerabilities.
Businesses, ships, aircraft operators and remote sites
- Ask your provider, in writing, whether link layer encryption is enabled for your service, and whether it costs extra. Then verify it.
- Run your own encryption. Site to site VPNs or IPsec over the satellite link, with a PEP that supports encryption where performance matters.
- Segment. A firewall between the terminal and operational networks such as ship systems, turbine controllers or point of sale. The terminal should not be on the same flat network as anything critical.
- Lock down management. No management interfaces reachable from the internet or from guest networks. Unique credentials. Logging.
- Plan for terminal loss. KA-SAT showed that a whole fleet can go offline at once. Have a backup path (cellular or a second provider) for anything that matters.
- Inventory. Know which terminal models and firmware versions you run.
How should satellite operators secure their spacecraft and links?
Authenticate every telecommand, including in safe mode. Encrypt telemetry and payload data, plan key management before launch, and enforce anti replay. Monitor the spacecraft for unexpected commands and state changes, require two people for high consequence commands, rehearse recovery, and keep an SBOM for every spacecraft that is updated with each upload.
Figure 11. The first six things each team should do.
- Command authentication everywhere. SDLS authentication or equivalent on every telecommand path, including backup and safe mode paths.
- Encrypt telemetry and payload data where commercial confidentiality or customer data is involved, and treat user traffic as public unless encrypted.
- Key management. Documented procedures for loading, rotating and revoking keys, with OTAR where the design supports it and strict control of the ground systems that hold keys.
- Anti replay. Enforce sequence number windows and alert on violations.
- Monitoring. Telemetry rules for unexpected commands, resets, mode changes and memory or table loads. Store command history off the operations network.
- Two person rules for high consequence commands such as memory writes, software uploads and propulsion.
- Recovery. A protected safe mode and recovery image, and rehearsed procedures for recovering from a bad command or upload.
- SBOM per spacecraft. Every framework, library and version on board, kept current as patches are uplinked.
- Contracts. Require security updates, SBOMs and vulnerability disclosure from bus, payload and software suppliers.
- Share and receive intelligence through an industry group such as the Space ISAC.
How should ground segment operators secure ground stations and mission control?
Treat the ground segment as critical infrastructure IT: no internet facing management, multifactor authentication and fast patching on remote access, strong segmentation between corporate IT and operations, current mission control software, locked down cloud accounts, and controls on mass operations.
- Remote access. Inventory every VPN and remote access appliance, patch it within days of a fix, review its configuration, require multifactor authentication, and monitor it. This was the KA-SAT entry point.
- Segmentation. Separate the network management and operations segments from corporate IT, with jump hosts and allow listed paths.
- Mission control. Patch Yamcs, OpenC3 COSMOS or whatever you run promptly. Do not expose it to the internet. Enforce login throttling, strong passwords and multifactor authentication. Review the CVEs above against your versions today.
- Command controls. Approval workflows for critical commands, rate limits and approvals for operations that touch many terminals, and full audit logs.
- Cloud ground stations. Least privilege roles, no long lived keys, multifactor authentication, logging of contacts and configuration changes, and a separate account for key material.
- Ransomware readiness. Offline backups of mission databases and configuration, and a plan to keep commanding the fleet if corporate IT is down.
- Build and update pipeline. Sign software and command loads, protect signing keys in hardware, and control who can trigger an upload.
- Endpoints. Operator workstations are high value targets. Our guide on how laptops get hacked applies directly.
How should satellite and terminal makers build secure products?
Build secure boot and signed updates, remove hardcoded credentials, fuzz every parser that handles uplinked or network bytes, use memory safety practices and compiler hardening, track every open source component in an SBOM, test against fault injection, and publish a vulnerability disclosure policy so researchers can report what they find.
Spacecraft and flight software
- Implement SDLS or equivalent authentication in the design, not as an option customers must turn on.
- Fuzz telecommand dispatch, file uplink, table loads and SDLS processing. CryptoLib, cFS and F Prime CVEs are all the kind of bug fuzzing finds.
- Validate every length and offset with overflow safe arithmetic. CVE-2026-41144 is a textbook integer wrap.
- Remove or gate debug, memory and shell capabilities in flight builds.
- Use the processor's memory protection features and compiler hardening.
- Ship a recovery image and safe mode that normal commands cannot overwrite.
- Keep an SBOM for every flight build, including vendored source.
User terminals
- Unique per device credentials and identities. No shared maintenance passwords.
- Secure boot rooted in hardware, chosen with fault injection resistance in mind, plus signed and versioned updates with anti rollback.
- A management interface that is off the WAN side by default.
- A protected recovery partition and factory reset path, so a wiped configuration does not mean a replaced unit.
- Least privilege for each terminal in the network, as Starlink described, so one compromised unit cannot affect others.
- Link encryption on by default, with no extra licence fee to enable it.
Ground software vendors
- Treat telemetry and command definitions as untrusted input in the UI.
- Do not store passwords in browser storage. Use secure session handling and login throttling.
- Publish advisories with CVEs and fixed versions, as the Yamcs and OpenC3 COSMOS projects did.
Across all of them
- A public vulnerability disclosure policy and, where possible, a bug bounty. The Starlink research came through one.
- SBOMs delivered to customers with every release.
- A commitment to how long each product will receive security updates.
How Safeguard helps teams that build space software
Safeguard covers the software supply chain inside space products in one platform: SBOMs for flight software, terminal firmware and ground systems, binary and image scanning, vulnerabilities ranked by reachability, SCA, SAST and secrets scanning on code you own, fix pull requests gated by your CI, Gold patched packages, supplier risk and compliance evidence.
Safeguard does not sit on the radio link or in the spacecraft. It sits where most long lived exposure in this guide comes from: the flight software, open source frameworks and libraries, terminal firmware, mission control software and cloud services that satellite makers, terminal makers and operators build and run. Teams that take this seriously often end up with one tool for source scanning, another for binary analysis, another for SBOM management, a questionnaire process for suppliers and a GRC platform for audits. Safeguard does that work end to end, with one inventory and one vulnerability model, from the first SBOM to the merged fix and the audit record.
Figure 12. How Safeguard fits satellite, terminal and ground software, from inputs to fixes and evidence.
See inside the binaries and images you ship and receive
In the Safeguard console, Integrations > Upload App Binary accepts compiled software: Windows EXE, MSI and DLL files, Android APKs and iOS IPAs, VM and disk images in QCOW2, VMDK, VHD and OVA formats, and container tarballs. Safeguard unpacks the file, identifies embedded libraries and their versions, maps them to known vulnerabilities and records licences, and the result becomes a project with a full SBOM. For space teams that covers mission control and ground software delivered as containers or VM images, operator desktop tools, companion mobile apps for terminals, and Linux based images for terminals and larger onboard computers. Raw firmware images for microcontrollers and RTOS based flight computers may need to be extracted into their component files first, and the usual limits of binary analysis apply: heavy obfuscation, encryption or unusual packing can give incomplete results. Our guide to scanning app binaries with Safeguard and our explainer on binary composition analysis go further.
Rank vulnerabilities by what can actually be reached
A ground software container or terminal image can contain hundreds of components, and many vulnerabilities in them sit in code your product never calls. Safeguard's reachability analysis ranks the vulnerabilities your code can actually reach above those it cannot, and adds EPSS (the Exploit Prediction Scoring System) and known exploited context. That is how a team tells a telecommand parser flaw that needs a fix in the next upload apart from an unused function in a bundled library, which matters a great deal when every patch to a spacecraft costs contact time.
Scan the code you own
For flight applications, terminal firmware, mission control extensions and backend services that you write, Safeguard runs software composition analysis (SCA) across the dependency tree, static application security testing (SAST) on your own code, and secrets scanning that catches signing keys, API tokens and hardcoded credentials before they ship. The bug classes in this guide (hardcoded terminal credentials, command injection, path traversal, integer overflow in bounds checks, passwords in browser storage) are exactly what static analysis and secrets scanning are for. A leaked command signing key or cloud ground station access key is worth catching in the repository, long before launch.
SBOMs your customers and auditors can use
Every project produces an SBOM you can export in CycloneDX or SPDX, among other formats. That is what lets an operator answer "which spacecraft and ground systems run CryptoLib 1.3.3, cFS 7.0.0 or Yamcs before 5.12.7" in minutes. Where a framework is vendored into your repository as source rather than pulled through a package manager, record it explicitly so it is tracked from the first build. Safeguard's Third-Party Risk Manager lets you request SBOMs from your own suppliers (bus, radio, terminal and software vendors), score them and monitor them continuously, so the supplier side of the chain is visible too. See SBOMs for firmware and IoT devices for the details.
Fix it without waiting for upstream
This is where Safeguard differs most from a scanner. For code in your repositories, Griffin, Safeguard's remediation model, opens a fix pull request that your own CI builds and tests before anyone merges it, and your policies decide what can merge. For open source components where upstream has not shipped a fix, or where the fix sits in a version you cannot move to without a larger change, Safeguard Gold provides patched, hardened builds of those packages, and Safeguard can fork and patch the vulnerable package so your next build pulls a fixed version. That matters in space more than almost anywhere. A mission that froze a framework version before launch cannot always move to the next release, and the cFS project says plainly that its open source fixes are not backported. Getting a targeted fix onto the version you actually fly, tested by your own pipeline, is the difference between uplinking a patch in the next contact campaign and carrying a known vulnerability for the life of the mission. Closed source components still have to come from their vendor, but the open source around them no longer has to wait.
Compliance evidence from the same data
Safeguard's compliance suite collects evidence for frameworks such as SOC 2 and ISO 27001 from the same scans, policies and fix history. For teams aligning a programme to ISO/TS 20517, answering customer security reviews, or preparing terminals for product security rules such as the EU Cyber Resilience Act, the SBOMs, vulnerability monitoring records, risk decisions and fix trail are the raw material those reviews ask for.
Deploy where your code lives
Flight software, command signing infrastructure and terminal firmware are sensitive. Safeguard runs as SaaS, in your own VPC, or fully on premises. For teams that will not grant repository access, the local runner CLI scans on your own machines and sends back only encrypted results. Safeguard can run in Zero AI mode with no language model in the loop, or with a model you choose.
How this compares
Space and device teams often combine several tools: a source SCA tool such as Snyk or Black Duck, a product security platform built for connected device makers such as Cybellum, which says it "brings the entire product security workflow into one dedicated platform", or Finite State, which focuses on helping device makers with product security, plus a GRC tool for audits. Those are capable products, and none of them, Safeguard included, replaces link encryption, command authentication or a ground segment security operations team. Safeguard's case is consolidation and remediation across the software itself: one inventory across source, binaries and images; one vulnerability model with reachability; fix pull requests and patched packages instead of tickets; and supplier risk and compliance evidence from the same data. It can also work alongside an existing product security platform and take over SBOM delivery and fixing.
The takeaway
Satellite hacking has a cinematic reputation: someone in a backyard steering a spacecraft. The public record is less dramatic and more useful. A remote access appliance with a configuration error. A management system that could talk to every modem at once. Terminals with passwords that were the same in every unit. Links that carried phone calls and grid tickets in the clear because encryption cost a licence fee and some bandwidth. Flight and ground frameworks with the same buffer and integer bugs as any other C code.
Nearly all of it is fixable with practices the rest of the industry already knows. Authenticate commands. Encrypt links and verify they stay encrypted. Patch and segment the ground. Design terminals that assume they will be opened. Cross check GNSS. And know exactly what software is in every spacecraft, terminal and ground system you run, because the next vulnerability will almost certainly arrive through a component someone else wrote, and you will want to fix it without waiting a quarter for it to travel down the chain.
Try it yourself
Click through these interactive Safeguard demos to see the steps described in this guide.
Test yourself
What are the four segments of a space system?
The space segment is the satellite, the ground segment is mission control, ground stations and operator IT, the link segment is the radio links, and the user segment is the terminals, modems and receivers customers use.
How did the 2022 KA-SAT incident work?
On 24 February 2022, an intruder used a misconfigured VPN appliance to reach the management segment of Viasat's KA-SAT network. They then sent legitimate management commands that overwrote key data in the flash memory of tens of thousands of consumer modems. The satellite itself was not compromised.
Can satellite internet traffic be intercepted?
Yes, when it is not encrypted. A 2025 study that scanned 411 transponders on 39 GEO satellites with consumer equipment found that 50% of the GEO links it observed carried cleartext IP traffic.
How are command and telemetry links protected?
With authentication and encryption at the data link layer. The CCSDS Space Data Link Security protocol adds a security header and trailer to each frame, plus sequence numbers against replay.
What is the difference between GNSS jamming and spoofing, and how is spoofing detected?
Jamming drowns the signals so the receiver loses its fix, while spoofing feeds counterfeit signals so the receiver computes a false position while appearing healthy. Spoofing is detected by checking GNSS against other sources and by authenticated signals such as Galileo OSNMA.
What should owners of satellite terminals do to protect themselves?
Keep the terminal's firmware updated, never expose its management interface, change default credentials, encrypt their own traffic with a VPN and TLS, and put a firewall between the terminal and the internal network.
Frequently asked questions
Can a satellite be hacked?
Yes, but rarely directly. Researchers have shown that satellite firmware often lacks modern protections and that open source flight frameworks have had serious bugs, and a satellite that accepts unauthenticated commands could be commanded by anyone with a capable uplink. In documented commercial incidents, though, attackers have gone after the ground network and user terminals instead, as in the 2022 KA-SAT case. Command authentication, patched flight software and a secure ground segment are the main protections.
How was the KA-SAT satellite network attacked in 2022?
According to Viasat's 30 March 2022 statement, an intruder used a misconfigured VPN appliance to reach the KA-SAT network's management segment on 24 February 2022, then sent legitimate management commands that overwrote key data in the flash memory of tens of thousands of consumer modems, taking them offline. Viasat found no compromise of the satellite, ground infrastructure, firmware images or supply chain, and shipped nearly 30,000 replacement modems.
Can someone hack a Starlink dish?
With physical access and considerable skill, researchers have. In 2022 Lennert Wouters of KU Leuven used a $25 modchip that performed voltage fault injection to bypass signature checks in the terminal's ROM bootloader and run his own code. It affects only the device being modified. SpaceX paid a bug bounty, updated firmware to make the attack harder, and relies on least privilege so one compromised terminal cannot affect the wider network. Keep your terminal updated and physically secure.
Is satellite internet traffic encrypted?
Not always. The 2025 Don't Look Up study found that 50% of the GEO links it observed carried cleartext IP traffic, including cellular backhaul and utility data, while nearly all consumer web and app traffic was already protected by TLS or QUIC. Link layer encryption is often optional, sometimes costs extra, and can fail open after misconfiguration. Encrypt your own traffic with TLS and a VPN, and confirm link encryption with your provider in writing.
What is GNSS spoofing and how do you detect it?
GNSS spoofing broadcasts counterfeit navigation signals so a receiver computes a false position or time while appearing healthy. Unlike jamming, it often triggers no alarm, as a 2013 superyacht experiment showed. OPSGROUP estimated in 2024 that about 1,500 flights a day were spoofed. Detect it by cross checking GNSS against inertial sensors, clocks and other sources, using multi constellation receivers, and using authenticated signals such as Galileo OSNMA.
What is CCSDS SDLS?
The Space Data Link Security protocol, CCSDS 355.0-B-2, adds a security header and trailer to space data link frames to provide authentication, encryption or authenticated encryption, using AES GCM or CMAC as specified in CCSDS 352.0-B-2, with sequence numbers to block replay. Its Extended Procedures (355.1-B-1) add key management, including over the air rekeying. The code implementing it must be secure too: CryptoLib, an open source SDLS library, had heap overflow CVEs in 2025.
Are open source flight software frameworks such as cFS and F Prime safe to use?
They are widely used, actively maintained, and their published CVEs show that people are reviewing them, which is a good sign. Like any C or C++ framework they have had memory and logic bugs, such as CVE-2025-25373 in cFS and CVE-2026-41144 in F Prime. Use them with command authentication in front, track exact versions in an SBOM, follow their releases, and remember cFS states that open source fixes are not backported to older releases.
Which standards and industry groups cover space cybersecurity?
For links, the CCSDS security books: SDLS (355.0-B-2), SDLS Extended Procedures (355.1-B-1), cryptographic algorithms (352.0-B-2) and authentication credentials (357.0-B-1). For managing cybersecurity across a programme, ISO/TS 20517:2024, published in July 2024. For ground IT, frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001. For threat intelligence sharing among companies, the Space ISAC.