Yes, most likely. A backup is a copy of whatever was in the system, so any API key, token or password stored in a database, config file or environment dump is copied too. Encrypt backups, limit who can read them, and rotate any secret that a backup reveals.
Why backups are a secrets problem
A production database often holds more than customer rows. Integration tokens, webhook signing keys, OAuth refresh tokens and session records live in ordinary tables. A dump of that database carries them into a file that may sit in storage with weaker access rules than production.
The same applies to server images, configuration exports and copies of infrastructure state. HashiCorp's documentation on Terraform state notes that state snapshots often include sensitive information. Anyone who can read the snapshot can read it all.
What the guidance says
The OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet is direct on three points:
- Backups should be encrypted and stored on secure storage with reduced access rights.
- Backup procedures should run automatically and periodically.
- Restore procedures should be tested often to confirm backups are intact.
It also says keys should not be stored next to the secrets they encrypt, unless the keys are themselves encrypted. The same logic applies to backups: do not keep the backup encryption key in the same place as the backup.
How to check your own backups
- Pick one recent backup of each type: database dump, config archive, state file, server image.
- Restore it into an isolated scratch environment that has no network path to production.
- Run a secret scanner over the restored files and over a text export of the database tables that hold credentials.
- Record what you find by category: live credentials, expired ones, test values.
- Check the access list on the backup location. Who can read it, and who can delete it?
Fixes, in order of value
- Encrypt at rest with a key managed separately from the backup store.
- Narrow read access to the few people and services that restore data.
- Move secrets out of the data where you can. A secrets manager holding a reference is better than a token in a table.
- Rotate anything found in a backup that has been broadly readable. Rotation makes the old copy worthless.
- Set a retention limit so old backups with old secrets age out.
A note on restores
When you restore a backup, you also restore the secrets it held, some of which may have been rotated since. After a restore, check which credentials in the restored data are still valid and which were revoked. A restored token that was revoked after an incident should stay revoked.
Safeguard includes secret detection in its scans and policy gates that can stop a commit carrying a credential. Try the free scan on a repository to see what it finds.
Quick check
Is an encrypted backup safe from secret exposure?
It is safer, not safe. Anyone with the key can read everything, so protect the key, limit restore access and rotate secrets that were exposed.
Should I delete old backups to reduce risk?
Set a retention period that matches your recovery needs and any legal duty to keep records, then let older copies expire on schedule. Do not delete ad hoc without checking.
Sources
Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.
