CVE-2026-28395 is an improper network binding flaw in OpenClaw's Chrome extension relay. If a wildcard cdpUrl is configured, the relay treats it as loopback and listens on every interface, so other hosts can reach it. NVD scores it 6.5. Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.12 or later.
What's affected
The GitHub advisory GHSA-qw99-grcx-4pvm lists affected versions 2026.1.14-1 up to but not including 2026.2.12, and patched versions 2026.2.12 and later, released 13 February 2026, of the npm package openclaw.
Two conditions apply. The Chrome extension relay must be installed and enabled, and a wildcard cdpUrl must be configured, meaning an address such as 0.0.0.0 or the IPv6 equivalent. Installs that do not use the relay, or that bind it to a specific loopback address, are outside the described condition.
The record scores it 6.5 (Medium). Remote attackers who can reach the host could learn that the service exists and which port it uses, or run denial of service and brute-force attempts against the relay token header. The weakness is classified as CWE-1327 (Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address). The advisory also mentions earlier hardening of authentication on certain relay endpoints in a separate commit.
How to check if you're exposed
Check your OpenClaw version.
npm ls openclaw
npm ls -g openclaw
Then check your configuration for the cdpUrl setting used by the Chrome extension relay. A wildcard address there is the trigger. You can also list listening sockets on the host and see whether the relay port is bound to all interfaces or only to loopback.
ss -ltnp
What to do now
- Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.12 or later.
- Set cdpUrl to a specific loopback address if you use the Chrome extension relay.
- Block the relay port at the host firewall so it is not reachable from other machines.
- Rotate the relay token if the port was ever exposed to untrusted networks, since the advisory mentions brute-force attempts against it.
- Review network scans of your hosts for unexpected open ports.
Why it matters
Services that are meant to be local should bind to loopback. The relay code treated the wildcard addresses as if they were loopback, so a setting that looked local actually opened the service to the network. The risk is a classic one: configuration that reads like it is safe and is not.
The impact in this record is modest, and the advisory rates it Moderate. The exposure is disclosure of service presence and port, plus denial of service and brute-force traffic against a token. There is no direct code execution described. That is exactly why it is worth fixing quickly and calmly. The change is small and the exposure is avoidable.
The broader practice is to bind explicitly and firewall by default. A service that listens on every interface is only as safe as the host firewall in front of it.
The record does not flag exploitation in the wild, and the CVE is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Quick check
Does this affect every OpenClaw install?
No. It needs the Chrome extension relay installed and enabled and a wildcard cdpUrl configured, according to the advisory.
What is the quickest mitigation?
Upgrade to 2026.2.12 or later. If you cannot, set cdpUrl to a specific loopback address and firewall the relay port.
Sources
Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.
