CVE-2022-34381 is a critical (CVSS 9.1) flaw in Dell BSAFE SSL-J and Crypto-J caused by an unmaintained third party component. Dell says an unauthenticated remote attacker could potentially compromise the system. Upgrade as Dell's advisory DSA-2022-208 directs, and verify the exact target versions on Dell's page.
What's affected
The record says Dell BSAFE SSL-J version 7.0 and all versions prior to 6.5, and Dell BSAFE Crypto-J versions prior to 6.2.6.1, contain the flaw. The title of Dell's advisory, DSA-2022-208, names SSL-J 6.5 and 7.1 and Crypto-J 6.2.6.1 and 7.0 as the fixed releases.
One caution. Dell's page returned an access denied response when I tried to fetch it, so the fixed versions above come from the advisory title in the record's reference list and from the record's description, not from the advisory body. Read the advisory itself before you plan the upgrade. Note also that the record's wording places SSL-J 7.0 in the affected set, while the advisory title names 7.1 as a fixed line, so a 7.0 deployment needs the newer 7.x release.
The record scores the issue 9.1 (Critical) with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N and classifies it as CWE-1329 (Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable).
How to check if you're exposed
BSAFE ships as Java libraries, so the exposure usually hides inside applications that bundle it, not inside a package you installed on purpose. Look for the jar names in your build outputs and containers:
find / -type f \( -iname '*ssl-j*' -o -iname '*crypto-j*' -o -iname '*cryptoj*' \) 2>/dev/null
In a Maven or Gradle project, search your dependency tree for the com.rsa and Dell BSAFE coordinates, then compare the versions found with the ones above. Vendor products that embed BSAFE will not show these jars in your own build files, so ask those vendors whether their product bundles BSAFE and which version.
What to do now
- Find every application and appliance that bundles BSAFE SSL-J or Crypto-J.
- Open Dell advisory DSA-2022-208 and confirm the fixed versions for your line.
- Upgrade SSL-J and Crypto-J, then rebuild and redeploy the applications that embed them.
- For vendor products that embed BSAFE, ask the vendor for a fixed release and a date.
- Until patched, limit network exposure of TLS services built on the affected libraries.
Why it matters
The weakness class is reliance on a component that is not updateable. In plain terms, the library depends on a third party piece that the supplier no longer maintains, so the usual cycle of upstream fix and downstream update does not exist. Dell's answer was to release new versions of the BSAFE libraries rather than patch the old ones.
That is the reason the score is high: network reachable, no privileges, no user interaction, with high confidentiality and integrity impact. Cryptographic libraries sit under TLS and other trust decisions, so a flaw there reaches everything that depends on them. The record's KEV flag is false, and no exploitation was reported in the material I could read.
This is also a good example of why a software bill of materials matters. The risk lives in a transitive Java dependency that most teams never chose directly.
Try it yourself
Click through it at your own pace, or open it full screen.
Quick check
Why is Dell's advisory title the source for fixed versions?
The advisory page blocked automated access when I reviewed this. The title is part of the record's own reference URL, so I used it and flagged that the body should be checked.
Does a Java dependency scan find this?
It can, if the jars or Maven coordinates are present in your project or container. Embedded copies inside vendor products need a vendor answer.
Sources
Safeguard can help you see this across many sites or repositories at once. Paste a manifest into the free in-browser dependency scan at gold.safeguard.sh/scan or look the issue up in the Gold directory to see how the record is tracked.
Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.