Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Almost every package manager supports post-install hooks that run arbitrary code. This is the most abused feature in supply chain attacks.
Go checksum database is one of the most underappreciated supply chain security features in any language ecosystem. Here is how it works and where it falls short.
Modern applications use multiple languages and package ecosystems. Analyzing dependencies across these boundaries requires techniques that single-ecosystem tools cannot provide.
Typosquatting remains one of the most effective supply chain attacks. Automated detection using string distance algorithms, behavioral analysis, and registry monitoring can catch malicious packages before they reach your builds.
Maven's dependency resolution mechanism can be exploited through repository poisoning, dependency confusion, and POM manipulation. Here is what Java teams need to know.
Poisoning attacks against the model supply chain have moved from research to incident reports. What detection looks like when the attack surface includes weights.
Symbolic links in package archives can redirect file operations to unintended locations. Here is how this old trick still works against modern tools.
CVSS alone can't tell you what to fix first. Here's how supply chain risk scoring blends exploitability, reachability, and provenance into one actionable number.
Rust build scripts run arbitrary code during compilation. Here is what they can access and how to evaluate the risk in your dependency tree.
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