Can a README or docs page prompt-inject your coding agent?
Yes. Any text an agent reads can steer it. See how indirect prompt injection reaches agents through docs and the permission habits that limit the damage.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Yes. Any text an agent reads can steer it. See how indirect prompt injection reaches agents through docs and the permission habits that limit the damage.
Yes. Any text an agent reads can act as an instruction. Defenses that hold: least privilege, human approval for risky actions, docs treated as untrusted.
Coding agents read READMEs and docs as context, and any file can carry instructions. Use this checklist to limit what a poisoned page can make them do.
Ship-to-shore cranes are remotely programmable machines. See what US authorities have said and a threat model for terminals adding AI planners and robots.
Loading a pickle file can run code. Prefer safetensors, load weights only from sources you can verify, and record where every model came from.
LLM10 covers uncontrolled inference that causes outages, surprise bills and model theft. See a worked scenario and the OWASP controls that stop it.
LLM09 misinformation means confident wrong answers from a model. See OWASP cases, from a chatbot lawsuit to invented packages, and how to reduce the risk.
Log the prompt, sources, model version and review outcome for consequential answers. Alert on ungrounded claims, unknown packages and unreviewed actions.
LLM09 covers confident but false model output. Grounding, validation and trained review help. Disclaimers alone do not. Start with your high-stakes uses.
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