prompt-injection
Safeguard articles tagged "prompt-injection" — guides, analysis, and best practices for software supply chain and application security.
135 articles
Threat-modeling for AI-native applications
STRIDE has six categories from 1999. OWASP's LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS's ~84 techniques show why agentic AI needs new threat-modeling columns, not a new framework.
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, Explained
The OWASP LLM Top 10 is the closest thing the field has to a shared checklist for AI security. Here is what each of the ten risks actually means, in plain language, with the defenses that matter.
Red-Teaming AI Applications: A Field Guide
You cannot secure an LLM application by reading its code alone. You have to attack it the way an adversary will — with language, with poisoned content, and with the goal of making it do something it should not. Here is how to run an AI red team.
Integrating AI Tools Without Expanding Your Attack Surface
Stanford researchers found developers using AI coding assistants wrote more security bugs — and felt more confident in them. Here's how to adopt AI safely.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications: A Practical Walkthrough
OWASP's 2025 LLM Top 10 added three new categories in one revision — here's what changed, why, and concrete mitigation patterns for each risk.
Prompt injection in AI coding assistant system prompts
Copilot, Cursor, and Windsurf all read untrusted repo text into the same channel as trusted instructions — three 2025 CVEs show what happens next.
Prompt injection via AI agent CI/CD workflow tampering
A single malicious PR title was enough to make three major AI coding agents leak API keys straight out of a GitHub Actions runner.
Protestware via prompt injection: when maintainers target AI agents
jqwik 1.10.0 shipped a hidden instruction telling AI coding agents to delete their own tests, then erased it from the terminal with ANSI codes — protestware built for agents, not humans.
What agentic coding environments reveal about developer risk
Snyk analyzed nearly 10,000 real developer environments and found 43% run 2+ AI coding tools at once — with MCP servers and skills quietly widening the attack surface.
CometJacking and the AI Browser Agent Threat Model
LayerX's October 2025 CometJacking attack siphoned Gmail and Calendar via one Perplexity Comet click. The browser-as-agent design is the new blast radius.
RAG Poisoning: Defenses That Work
Retrieval-augmented generation is the most common LLM deployment pattern in the enterprise and the most commonly poisoned. A senior security engineer's playbook for defences that hold up in production.
LLM Jailbreak Prevention: A Defense-in-Depth Playbook
A jailbreak is not the same thing as a prompt injection, and conflating them leads to defenses that miss. Here is how modern jailbreaks actually work and the layered controls that hold the line.
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