CVE-2026-65097 is a high severity (CVSS 7.5) flaw in the installation scripts of NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux, which download code without an integrity check. A successful attack could lead to code execution, privilege escalation and data tampering. NVIDIA lists 0.0.21 as the updated version.
What's affected
The NVIDIA bulletin (updated 25 August 2026) lists NemoClaw on Linux with affected versions 0 to 0.0.21 and updated version 0.0.21, tied to commit 48c0d54d4. The weakness is CWE-494 (download of code without integrity check). Record and bulletin agree on the 7.5 score. The record also lists the Linux kernel among its products. The bulletin shows the vulnerable software is the NVIDIA product on Linux, not the kernel itself.
As with the sibling migration CVE, the version columns list 0.0.21 as both the last affected and the updated version. Treat that as a point to verify: update to the latest release from NVIDIA's repository and confirm the commit.
The vector is network based, high complexity, no privileges and user interaction required, with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
How to check if you're exposed
Check the version or commit of your NemoClaw install and how you got it.
git -C /path/to/NemoClaw log -1 --format=%h 2>/dev/null
If you installed by running a script that fetched components from the network, you cannot assume what it downloaded was verified. Check your install notes or shell history for how it was run, and compare with the bulletin.
Whatever the product, a current inventory of what you run is what turns a CVE notice into a quick answer. The Gold page for this CVE tracks how its record changes over time, and the free in-browser dependency scan at gold.safeguard.sh/scan covers the application libraries you ship.
What to do now
- Update NemoClaw from NVIDIA's official repository and confirm the version against the bulletin.
- Do not run install scripts piped straight from the network on production hosts. Download, review and verify first.
- Where NVIDIA publishes checksums or signatures, check them before running anything.
- Rebuild images or hosts that were provisioned with an older install script.
- Mirror approved installers internally so installs do not depend on live downloads.
Why it matters
If an installer fetches code and runs it without checking a hash or signature, anything that can alter the download, such as a compromised mirror or an on-path attacker, can change what runs. Installers often run with elevated rights, so the damage can be large.
The class is CWE-494. The fix pattern is old and simple: pin versions and verify integrity before use. The record does not list the CVE as exploited in the wild.
Quick check
Does a user have to do something?
The vector requires user interaction, which fits an install script that someone has to run.
Sources
Last reviewed: 18 October 2026.
