CVE-2026-25968 is a high severity flaw (CVSS 7.4) in ImageMagick, where a long attribute value overflows a fixed-size stack buffer in msl.c, the code that handles Magick Scripting Language files. The weakness classes are CWE-121 and CWE-787, both memory corruption. Upgrade to ImageMagick 7.1.2-15 or 6.9.13-40, the patched releases. It is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog.
What's affected
- ImageMagick 7.x before 7.1.2-15
- ImageMagick 6.9.x before 6.9.13-40
- Fixed in 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40
The advisory lists no workaround. Upgrading is the remedy it names. Many other products embed ImageMagick through libraries such as Magick++, so the version of the command line tool on your laptop may not be the one that matters.
How to check if you're exposed
Check the version of the tool on each host that converts images:
magick -version
convert -version
The second command covers older 6.x installs. Then look for bundled copies: language bindings, container images and application packages that ship their own ImageMagick. A system package manager only reports what it installed itself.
Safeguard has a free in-browser dependency scan at https://gold.safeguard.sh/scan that reads a manifest or lockfile and flags known vulnerable packages, with no repository access needed. For container images, check the package list of the image rather than the host.
What to do now
- Upgrade to 7.1.2-15 or 6.9.13-40 or later, through your distribution package or by rebuilding from the project's release.
- Rebuild and redeploy container images and applications that bundle ImageMagick, then confirm the version inside the running image.
- Find the services that accept uploads from users or fetch images from outside and note which ones call ImageMagick.
- Where upgrading must wait, limit which formats ImageMagick will decode using its policy file, which is a general hardening step and not something this advisory prescribes.
- Keep ImageMagick in your software inventory so the next advisory is a lookup, not a search.
Why it matters
MSL is a scripting format that ImageMagick can interpret. The advisory says a long value in an attribute overflows a fixed-size stack buffer in msl.c and leads to memory corruption. It gives no further detail, and it does not say whether this can reach code execution, so we will not claim that.
The vector is network based with high attack complexity and no privileges, which matches how this tends to play out: an attacker needs a way to get a crafted file in front of a service that processes MSL.
The class matters for triage. Image decoders run on bytes you do not control, so any memory safety bug in a coder is reachable wherever your product accepts an image. Reachability analysis helps here: it shows whether your code actually calls the vulnerable coder, so you can order the upgrades by real exposure instead of by score alone.
Quick check
Is this one exploited in the wild?
The record does not flag it as a CISA KEV entry, and the advisory we read does not report exploitation. Treat it as a patch-soon item, not an incident.
Do I need to process MSL at all?
Most applications convert plain image formats and never need MSL. If yours does not, disabling that coder through ImageMagick's policy file removes the exposure for this and for the other MSL issues fixed in the same release. That is general hardening, not advice from the advisory.
Sources
Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.
