CVE-2025-66262 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) arbitrary file overwrite in the Mozart FM Transmitter. A restore script extracts user controlled tar archives into the filesystem root without path checks. Combined with the unauthenticated upload flaws, a crafted archive can overwrite critical files. The record names no fix.
What's affected
- Product: Mozart FM Transmitter from DB Electronica Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. (DB Broadcast), web management interface. The record lists models 30, 50, 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 6000 and 7000.
- Component: the restore_mozzi_memories.sh script, which extracts tar archives with the root directory as the target.
- Fixed: neither the record nor the researcher write-up we read names a fixed firmware version or a vendor advisory. Contact the vendor for patch status before assuming one exists.
- Severity: the record scores it 9.8 (critical) with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The record states that the flaw combines with the unauthenticated upload issues in the same product, which is why it reaches a critical score of 9.8.
How to check if you're exposed
This is a broadcast appliance, so there is no package manager to query. Work from the device and the network.
- Build a list of every Mozart unit you run, with its model and the web interface version string. The researcher write-up refers to the web management interface version WEBMOZZI-00287.
- Find out whether the management web interface of each unit is reachable from the internet, from a partner network or from a flat internal network. Check firewall rules and any remote access gateway.
- Look at the web server logs on a device you can inspect, or at the logs of any proxy in front of it, for requests to the PHP file named in this CVE from addresses you do not recognize.
If the interface is reachable by people outside the small group that needs it, treat the device as exposed.
What to do now
- Take the management interface off the internet and off any shared network. Put it behind a VPN or a jump host, with an allow list of administrator addresses.
- Ask DB Broadcast for the patch status of this CVE and for a firmware version that fixes it. Record the answer with your asset notes.
- Treat any unit that was reachable as potentially modified. Plan to restore it from a vendor supplied clean image once available.
- Watch the device for unexpected files, new accounts, changed settings or reboots, and keep a known good copy of its configuration to compare against.
- Add the rest of your internet facing software to an inventory. Safeguard cannot patch a transmitter, but a free in-browser scan at gold.safeguard.sh/scan and a proper asset inventory help you find the other internet facing software you run, and reachability analysis helps you rank what to fix first.
Why it matters
The weakness is CWE-22, path traversal. The record says the script extracts archives into the file system root and does not validate the paths inside them. An archive that includes entries with directory traversal can then write files over system locations, such as web files and account files, in the places the device allows writes.
This is a good example of a chain: an upload flaw puts the archive on the device, and the restore script unpacks it with too much trust. Fixing either link helps, but the safest approach is to treat all of them as one problem. Extraction code should reject absolute paths and parent directory entries, and extract into a dedicated folder. The record does not mark this as exploited in the wild and it is not on the CISA KEV list. The advisory trail is thin, since the main public source is a researcher write-up rather than a vendor bulletin, so confirm facts with the vendor. Appliances of this kind sit for years without updates, which is why network isolation is the control you can apply today.
Quick check
How does the attacker get an archive onto the device?
The record says the flaw combines with the unauthenticated upload issues in the same product.
What should extraction code do?
Reject paths that are absolute or that climb out of the target folder, and extract into a dedicated folder.
Sources
- Researcher write-up: 14 vulnerabilities in the Mozart FM Transmitter web interface
- Safeguard Gold entry
Last reviewed: 18 October 2026.
