CVE-2025-5510 is a medium severity server-side request forgery in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to version 1.2.1. The url argument of the /app/sys/article/optimize endpoint makes the server fetch an address the user chooses. The reporter says the maintainer did not respond, and no fixed version is named.
What's affected
- Product: quequnlong shiyi-blog.
- Affected: up to and including 1.2.1.
- Component:
/app/sys/article/optimize, argumenturl. - Fixed version: none is named. The reporter says the vendor did not respond.
- Authentication: low privileges required, so a logged in account is needed.
Two other CVEs were published on the same day for the same product versions: CVE-2025-5509 (path traversal in file upload) and CVE-2025-5512 (improper authentication in the administrator backend). A single review should cover all three.
How to check if you're exposed
Check which shiyi-blog version you run, and review where the server can connect to.
- Check logs for requests to the article optimize endpoint, and for outbound requests from the application server to addresses that are not part of normal operation.
- Review the network egress rules for the host. A blog server rarely needs to reach internal admin systems or cloud metadata addresses.
- Look at which accounts can use the article features, and remove those you do not need.
Safeguard has a free in-browser dependency scan at gold.safeguard.sh/scan that checks a manifest or lockfile against known vulnerabilities, and the Gold directory lists affected packages for each CVE.
What to do now
- Confirm the version and whether the backend is reachable from outside.
- Look for a fix in the project repository newer than 1.2.1. None is named in the record.
- Block outbound connections from the application host to internal ranges and cloud metadata addresses unless required.
- Restrict who can reach the backend and the article tools, ideally to a VPN or an allowlist.
- If you maintain a fork, add a strict allowlist of schemes and hosts for any feature that fetches a user supplied address.
Why it matters
Server-side request forgery turns the application into a proxy. The server can reach places a visitor cannot, such as internal services or cloud metadata endpoints, so a feature that fetches a URL on a user's behalf becomes a way to look inside the network.
Fixing SSRF needs more than a blocklist of bad addresses. Validate the address after it is resolved, limit the schemes allowed, refuse redirects to private ranges, and use egress controls at the network level. The score is medium because the vector shows low impact, but the real effect depends on what the host can reach.
The weakness is classed as CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). Severity in the CVE record: medium, CVSS 6.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).
Quick check
What does SSRF let an attacker do?
Make the server send requests to addresses the attacker picks. That can expose internal services that are not reachable from outside.
What helps without a patch?
Egress filtering from the application host, plus access control on the backend that holds the vulnerable feature.
Sources
- Researcher write-up on GitHub (listed in the CVE record, not fetched)
- VulDB entry 310924 (listed in the CVE record, not fetched)
Last reviewed: 18 October 2026.
