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Vulnerability Analysis•

CVE-2024-0455: High SSRF in the AnythingLLM Web Scraper

CVE-2024-0455: AnythingLLM web scraper can be pointed at a cloud metadata address and return credentials (CVSS 7.5). Update and block that address.

Safeguard Security Team
4 min read

CVE-2024-0455 is a high severity (CVSS 7.5) server side request forgery flaw in the AnythingLLM web scraper. A user could point the scraper at a cloud instance metadata address and read connection credentials. Update to a release with the fix and block that address.

What's affected

AnythingLLM from Mintplex Labs. The record gives no version range, and the product entry has no version. The description says the built in web scraper accepts a URL that resolves only from inside an EC2 instance, the special link local metadata address, and returns what it finds. That could expose credentials for the instance and allow managing it.

The linked commit, b2b2c2a, is the fix. We could not confirm the release number that includes it, so check the project release notes.

The weakness is CWE-918, server side request forgery. The description adds conditions. The user would need pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infrastructure, and the request resolves only if the instance runs on EC2 and a proper firewall or iptables rule is not set.

Source conflict: the description says the person must have the proper authorization level, listed as manager, admin, and in single user mode. The CVSS vector in the record, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, says no privileges required. Treat the plain reading as: you need access to the scraper feature, and the score assumes the worst case. It is not on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list.

How to check if you're exposed

You are in scope if you run AnythingLLM and the web scraper is available to any user. Then ask where it runs. On a cloud host with an instance metadata service reachable from the app's network, the risk is real. On a laptop or a machine with no such service, the described outcome does not apply.

If you run on AWS, check how the instance metadata service is configured. Requiring the token based version of that service and limiting hop counts is the provider's standard hardening, and is documented by AWS. Then compare your AnythingLLM version with the release notes for the fix commit.

What to do now

  1. List your AnythingLLM instances and where each is hosted.
  2. Update to a release that includes the fix.
  3. On cloud hosts, require the token based metadata service, and block the application from reaching the metadata address with a firewall rule.
  4. Reduce the roles that can use the scraper to those who need it.
  5. If you suspect the address was queried, rotate the credentials of the instance role and review recent use of them in your cloud audit logs.
  6. Give the instance role the least access it needs, so a leak reaches little.

Why it matters

Server side request forgery turns your server into the requester. The server can reach addresses that the outside world cannot, and the metadata address is the best known example, because it can hold credentials for the machine's cloud role.

The defence has two layers. The application should refuse private and link local destinations when fetching user supplied URLs, and the network should block that address from workloads that have no need for it. Either layer alone leaves a gap.

Quick check

Does CVE-2024-0455 only affect AWS?

The description uses an EC2 address as its example. Other clouds have similar metadata services, so the same hardening idea applies, but check the project advisory.

Who can use the scraper?

The description lists manager, admin, and single user mode. The vector says no privileges required, so check your own role settings.

Sources

Last reviewed: 19 October 2026.

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