How do you answer 'Who can add an MCP server?' on change control
Reviewers ask who may connect a new MCP server and how it is approved. Answer with roles, a short intake, and what happens to servers that skip it.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Reviewers ask who may connect a new MCP server and how it is approved. Answer with roles, a short intake, and what happens to servers that skip it.
Models change often. Answer with the provider and role of each model, plus how you review a model change before it reaches customer data or tools.
No control stops prompt injection outright. Answer by describing layers: limited tool scope, approvals, untrusted input handling, and monitoring.
Answer transport questions with HTTPS endpoints, secure session IDs that are not used for authentication, and how local servers avoid network exposure.
Answer by action type, not with a blanket yes: which agent actions need approval, who approves, what the prompt shows, and what gets logged.
Reviewers want to know who can call your MCP server and with what token. Answer with the flow, token audience, lifetime and revocation, in plain facts.
Local MCP servers run with the user's privileges. Answer the sandbox question with what isolation exists, what it blocks, and what is still open.
A good logging answer lists what is recorded, where it is kept, how long, who can read it, and what it never contains. Sample wording and gaps included.
Reviewers ask whether you know which MCP servers your agents can reach. Here is a truthful answer, the fields to track, and the evidence to offer.
Weekly insights on software supply chain security, delivered to your inbox.
Your first fix PR is minutes away.
No sales call required, even your agent can complete the purchase over MCP.