Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Socket disclosed TrapDoor on May 24, 2026: 34+ malicious packages and 384+ versions across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io built to steal crypto wallets, SSH keys, and cloud credentials from crypto, DeFi, Solana, and AI developers.
OX Security disclosed a DPRK-aligned campaign that abused Hugging Face as a malware host and data-exfiltration backend, using public repos to serve second-stage payloads and private datasets to receive stolen developer secrets.
On 14 May 2026, three malicious node-ipc versions (9.1.6, 9.2.3, 12.0.1) shipped an 80 KB credential-stealing IIFE appended after module.exports in the CJS bundle — no install scripts, harvesting 90+ secret categories from a library with 10M+ weekly downloads.
On May 11, 2026, attackers chained a pull_request_target abuse, cache poisoning, and OIDC token theft to publish 84 malicious @tanstack npm versions from TanStack's own trusted pipeline. It is the first npm compromise to carry valid SLSA provenance.
Every package on npm is signed by the registry, but the actual posture of install-time signature verification across real-world tooling is patchier than the headline suggests. This is where npm audit signatures and downstream verifiers stand in 2026.
npm Trusted Publishing replaces long-lived publish tokens with short-lived OIDC-issued credentials tied to a specific CI workflow. Here is the 2026 rollout state, what the migration actually looks like, and where the rough edges still are.
On 11-12 May 2026, the TeamPCP-linked Mini Shai-Hulud worm published 84 malicious artifacts across 42 TanStack npm packages in six minutes, then spread to 160+ packages by abusing GitHub Actions OIDC tokens and CI cache poisoning.
npm provenance ties a published package to the specific GitHub Actions run that built it, signed through sigstore. Here is how to enable it for a publisher, verify it on the install side, and enforce it in CI without breaking your release process.
JS reachability with npm's nested trees, dynamic require, ESM/CJS interop, and bundler dead code elimination. What modern tools resolve and what they punt.
Weekly insights on software supply chain security, delivered to your inbox.