Can an AI agent pass its permissions to another agent?
A delegate agent should never exceed what its caller may grant. Delegation rules between agents: narrower scope, shorter life, own identity, linked logs.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
A delegate agent should never exceed what its caller may grant. Delegation rules between agents: narrower scope, shorter life, own identity, linked logs.
No. An agent that approves its own action is not a control. Put approval and authorization outside the model, in systems it cannot edit. Here is how.
Yes, in principle. Text returned by a tool can carry instructions a model may follow. How prompt injection works through connectors and how to limit it.
Advisories, issues and scanner output contain third party text. If an LLM reads it, hidden instructions can steer it. How to reduce that risk.
Yes, indirect prompt injection can ride in on code comments, issue text or package metadata a fix generator reads. How to contain it with controls.
TensorFlow's security guidance says a model is a program, so an untrusted model equals untrusted code. Here is what that means and how to isolate one.
Yes. A prompt template steers a model like code steers a program, so it needs an owner, review, versioning and a change record like any dependency.
No. The MCP specification says clients must treat tool annotations as untrusted unless the server is trusted. What that means when you buy a connector.
Tier agent actions by how easily they can be undone: auto, notify, approve, or block. A simple reversibility test and a table you can adopt this week.
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