When the platform that ships everyone else's code gets popped, everyone gets popped. Codecov, 3CX, Kaseya, SolarWinds — the pattern keeps repeating. Safeguard ships the SLSA L3+ build factory, marketplace governance, customer trust packets, and runtime Guard that closes the chain-attack loop.
When the platform that ships everyone else's code gets popped, everyone gets popped. The chain-attack pattern keeps repeating.
Customer-supplied CI jobs run on your infrastructure. A sandbox escape is a cross-tenant incident in waiting.
Marketplaces multiply attack surface. Plugin-publishing pipelines need the same scrutiny as your own code.
Every customer is a regulator-audit-waiting-to-happen. SOC 2, SLSA L3+, FedRAMP HIGH expectations from day one.
Every shipped runner agent, every released installer, every build artefact attested with in-toto + sigstore. SLSA L3-L4.
Signing requirements, capability scoping, security review of community plugins. The marketplace doesn't become an attack vector.
Per-release SBOM, provenance, scan history, signed audit log — exportable for customer security teams.
Same policy enforced at runtime via eBPF/sidecar. Sandbox escape attempts caught at the syscall layer.
Hermetic builds, in-toto attestation, sigstore signing on every released artefact.
Every customer-runner action emits a signed event. Streamed to customer SIEM in real time.
Plugin submissions go through security review + sigstore signing. Capability scope declared per plugin.
eBPF + sidecar enforcement on customer-runner workloads. Same policy as CI/IDE applied at runtime.
Untrusted CI jobs running on shared infra are the highest-value exfiltration target. Runtime Guard catches it.
A trojaned plugin is downstream supply-chain damage. Capability scoping + signing closes the path.
Plugins running with broad privileges leak secrets through logs, env, telemetry. Lino on egress catches it.
AI-augmented build runners are new attack surface. MCP-server inspection + Guard close the loop.
Trojaned uploader/installer pattern reaching customer builds.
We address this throughHijacked release-signing pipeline shipping malicious updates.
We address this throughCascading supply-chain attack pattern via the platform.
We address this throughBuild-system implant pattern injecting at compile time.
We address this throughAutomated dependency-bump tooling abused for malicious updates.
We address this through| Metric | Before Safeguard | With Safeguard |
|---|---|---|
| SLSA L3-L4 attestation prep | 8 weeks | Continuous |
| Marketplace security review | Reactive | Continuous |
| Customer-runner audit logs | Manual | Signed default |
| Tools across the stack | 9 vendors | 1 |
| Alert noise reduction | Baseline | ↓ 85% |
| Per-release trust packet | 2 weeks | 1 hour |
| Tenant isolation drill | Quarterly | Continuous |