Aviation & Aerospace. Airworthiness-grade software supply chain evidence.
Airlines, OEMs, MROs, and airport operators carry software-driven safety obligations across configurations that stay in service for ten years and more. DO-326A, ED-202A, EASA Part-IS, and ACSF turn every avionics dependency into a continuous airworthiness security question. Safeguard makes that question a signed, attestable query — even inside an air-gapped MRO bay.
Four forces converging on the flight deck.
Airworthiness regulators, airport inspectors, and a decade-plus service life are collapsing into one continuous evidence requirement.
DO-326A / ED-202A airworthiness security
Airworthiness security is now a certification gate, not a working group. Every change to a connected avionics component carries a continuous airworthiness security obligation across its service life — sometimes longer than ten years.
EASA Part-IS information security
EASA Part-IS extends information-security management to design, production, MRO, and operations. Annual paper audits no longer satisfy a regulator that expects live evidence across the entire airworthiness configuration.
ACSF airport cyber rules
Aviation Cyber Security Framework rules and equivalent national regimes pull airports and ground-handling operators into the regulated critical-infrastructure perimeter. Software supply chain evidence is now part of the audit.
Ten-year+ software service life
Avionics components stay in service for a decade or more. A CVE disclosed today still has to be evaluated against airworthiness configurations from years ago — without a signed SBOM history, that evaluation is guesswork.
Capability mapped to airworthiness reality.
Signed avionics SBOMs per airworthiness configuration
Every airworthiness configuration emits a signed CycloneDX SBOM tied to the build that produced it. A regulator's query against a tail number lands on a deterministic, attestable bill of materials.
Reachability on long-tail patch evaluations
Reachability analysis lets safety engineers evaluate a CVE against an airworthiness configuration that has been in service for years. The same library is treated differently depending on whether it is reached in the certified path.
PSIRT coordinated disclosure pipeline
A signed inbox for researcher and OEM disclosures, with workflow that respects coordinated disclosure timelines and airworthiness change control. The PSIRT lifecycle becomes a tracked, auditable pipeline.
Air-gapped MRO ground-system deployment
The full stack runs inside an air-gapped MRO environment for the most sensitive maintenance and overhaul workloads. No internet egress, customer-controlled keys, delta-sync of vulnerability data via signed offline bundles.
Frameworks the platform is mapped to.
Pre-mapped control narratives and evidence in the formats your airworthiness authority and airport regulator already accept.
A typical deployment across an aviation programme.
Airworthiness-CI signing pipeline, air-gapped MRO ground-system enclave, airport DMZ control plane, and a PSIRT disclosure inbox tied to DO-326A change control.
Airworthiness-CI signing pipeline
Every airworthiness build emits a signed CycloneDX SBOM with provenance tied to the change record. Configuration management and security evidence are the same artefact, not two spreadsheets.
MRO ground-system air-gap
MRO ground systems run the full stack inside an air-gapped enclave. Vulnerability, KEV, and EPSS data sync via signed offline bundles — delta only, not the full pull every refresh.
Airport DMZ control plane
Airport operators run a DMZ control plane with one-way ingress from operational systems. Audit log streams to the operator SIEM in JSON and CycloneDX, ready for an ACSF inspection.
PSIRT disclosure inbox
Signed coordinated-disclosure inbox for researchers, OEMs, and operators. Workflow respects DO-326A change control; every step is a signed event in the audit log.
Four risk surfaces your safety board already worries about.
Avionics OEM firmware backdoor
Compromised firmware shipped from OEM update channels can reach connected avionics components without signed provenance to flag the deviation against the certified configuration.
MRO software supply-chain compromise
MRO ground systems, EFB loaders, and maintenance tooling sit on a software stack supplied by many vendors. A compromised dependency anywhere in that chain can reach the airframe.
Airport operational-tech ransomware
Baggage, ground-handling, and airfield-lighting systems are increasingly software-defined. Ransomware on operational tech grounds an airport even when no aircraft is touched.
GPS/ADS-B spoofing through libraries
Vulnerable GNSS and ADS-B receiving libraries embedded in airborne and ground systems can be coerced via spoofing — a software supply chain failure, not a radio failure.
What is actually hitting aviation this year.
- Airworthiness CVE long-tail (10+ year service life)CVEs disclosed today still have to be evaluated against airworthiness configurations from years ago — signed SBOM history is the only defensible record.We address this through Signed SBOM + reachable-CVE prioritisation
- MRO ground-system ransomwareMRO ground systems, EFB loaders, and maintenance tooling are increasingly targeted; signed provenance and reachability scope the blast radius before it reaches the airframe.We address this through Eagle reachability + KEV prioritisation
- Avionics OEM vendor compromiseCompromised OEM update channels reach connected avionics components; vendor attestation and concentration heatmaps surface the risk before installation.We address this through TPRM with vendor attestation
- ADS-B spoofing through librariesVulnerable ADS-B and GNSS libraries embedded in airborne and ground systems can be coerced via spoofing — a software supply chain failure.We address this through SCA on navigation libraries
- ACSF audit gapsAirport cyber-security framework audits increasingly demand continuous evidence on the software supply chain across ground-handling, baggage, and airfield systems.We address this through Comply with global regulations
Quantified benefits for aviation operators.
Numbers from production deployments across airlines, OEMs, MROs, and airport operators. Same airworthiness baseline, dramatically less spreadsheet.
| Metric | Before Safeguard | With Safeguard |
|---|---|---|
| Airworthiness CVE evaluation prep | 30 days | 2 days |
| MRO software patch cycle | 60 days | 7 days |
| PSIRT response | 21 days | 2 days |
| Tool consolidation | 8 vendors | 1 |
| Air-gapped sync | Full pull | Delta only |
| Alert noise | ~80% | ~5% |
| Airport cyber audit prep | 8 weeks | 1 day |
Evidence at the speed of an airworthiness directive.
Talk to the team about DO-326A evidence pipelines, EASA Part-IS mappings, and an air-gapped MRO deployment shape that lives inside your airworthiness perimeter.