Airlines, OEMs, MROs, and airport operators carry software-driven safety obligations across configurations that stay in service for ten years and more. DO-326A, ED-202A, EASA Part-IS, and ACSF turn every avionics dependency into a continuous airworthiness security question. Safeguard makes that question a signed, attestable query — even inside an air-gapped MRO bay.
Airworthiness regulators, airport inspectors, and a decade-plus service life are collapsing into one continuous evidence requirement.
Airworthiness security is now a certification gate, not a working group. Every change to a connected avionics component carries a continuous airworthiness security obligation across its service life — sometimes longer than ten years.
EASA Part-IS extends information-security management to design, production, MRO, and operations. Annual paper audits no longer satisfy a regulator that expects live evidence across the entire airworthiness configuration.
Aviation Cyber Security Framework rules and equivalent national regimes pull airports and ground-handling operators into the regulated critical-infrastructure perimeter. Software supply chain evidence is now part of the audit.
Avionics components stay in service for a decade or more. A CVE disclosed today still has to be evaluated against airworthiness configurations from years ago — without a signed SBOM history, that evaluation is guesswork.
Every airworthiness configuration emits a signed CycloneDX SBOM tied to the build that produced it. A regulator's query against a tail number lands on a deterministic, attestable bill of materials.
Reachability analysis lets safety engineers evaluate a CVE against an airworthiness configuration that has been in service for years. The same library is treated differently depending on whether it is reached in the certified path.
A signed inbox for researcher and OEM disclosures, with workflow that respects coordinated disclosure timelines and airworthiness change control. The PSIRT lifecycle becomes a tracked, auditable pipeline.
The full stack runs inside an air-gapped MRO environment for the most sensitive maintenance and overhaul workloads. No internet egress, customer-controlled keys, delta-sync of vulnerability data via signed offline bundles.
Pre-mapped control narratives and evidence in the formats your airworthiness authority and airport regulator already accept.
Airworthiness-CI signing pipeline, air-gapped MRO ground-system enclave, airport DMZ control plane, and a PSIRT disclosure inbox tied to DO-326A change control.
Every airworthiness build emits a signed CycloneDX SBOM with provenance tied to the change record. Configuration management and security evidence are the same artefact, not two spreadsheets.
MRO ground systems run the full stack inside an air-gapped enclave. Vulnerability, KEV, and EPSS data sync via signed offline bundles — delta only, not the full pull every refresh.
Airport operators run a DMZ control plane with one-way ingress from operational systems. Audit log streams to the operator SIEM in JSON and CycloneDX, ready for an ACSF inspection.
Signed coordinated-disclosure inbox for researchers, OEMs, and operators. Workflow respects DO-326A change control; every step is a signed event in the audit log.
Compromised firmware shipped from OEM update channels can reach connected avionics components without signed provenance to flag the deviation against the certified configuration.
MRO ground systems, EFB loaders, and maintenance tooling sit on a software stack supplied by many vendors. A compromised dependency anywhere in that chain can reach the airframe.
Baggage, ground-handling, and airfield-lighting systems are increasingly software-defined. Ransomware on operational tech grounds an airport even when no aircraft is touched.
Vulnerable GNSS and ADS-B receiving libraries embedded in airborne and ground systems can be coerced via spoofing — a software supply chain failure, not a radio failure.
Numbers from production deployments across airlines, OEMs, MROs, and airport operators. Same airworthiness baseline, dramatically less spreadsheet.
| Metric | Before Safeguard | With Safeguard |
|---|---|---|
| Airworthiness CVE evaluation prep | 30 days | 2 days |
| MRO software patch cycle | 60 days | 7 days |
| PSIRT response | 21 days | 2 days |
| Tool consolidation | 8 vendors | 1 |
| Air-gapped sync | Full pull | Delta only |
| Alert noise | ~80% | ~5% |
| Airport cyber audit prep | 8 weeks | 1 day |
Talk to the team about DO-326A evidence pipelines, EASA Part-IS mappings, and an air-gapped MRO deployment shape that lives inside your airworthiness perimeter.